


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GO WORLD
NOVEMBER NO.16
DECEMBER 1979





Together with Kitani's widow, Otake Hideo offers his respects at the grave of his teacher, Kitani Minoru, the day after defending the Meijin title.

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The cover: A triptych by Kunimasa III (1823 – 80), published in 1878 and showing go players on stage in a scene from a kabuki play being performed at the Shintomiza theatre at the start of the autumn season in that year. (Collection of William Pinckard)

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Otake Brilliantly Defends Meijin Title

This year's Meijin title match found Otake Meijin in superb form and he brushed aside the challenge of Sakata Eio 9-dan by the lopsided margin of four wins to one loss. Otake's brilliant play once the series began was a striking contrast to his mediocre form earlier in the year, as the reader can confirm for himself by comparing the three Gosei title games and the four Meijin games given in this issue.

A major factor in Otake's victory was the sheer determination and concentration with which he approached the series. He used plenty of time, going into byo-yomi in a two-day game for the first time in his career, but even when short of time the accuracy of his endgame play surprised even other professionals. In contrast, Sakata was handicapped by uncharacteristically poor endgame play — his stamina was just not up to the two-day games. He used too much time and energy in the fuseki and middle game, leaving him with no reservoir of strength to draw on at the end. All in all, it was a very unsatisfactory series for Sakata, but it would not have been easy to win however good his form, for Otake seems to be developing into one of the great Meijins.

The results:

Game 1 (Sept. 12,13). Otake (W) won by 6½ points.
Game 2 (Sept. 26, 27). Otake (B) won by ½ point.
Game 3 (Oct. 3, 4). Sakata (W) won by resignation.
Game 4 (Oct. 17, 18). Otake (W) won by resignation.
Game 5 (Oct. 24, 25). Otake (B) won by 7½ points.

5th Meijin League

The three vacant places in the 5th Meijin league have been taken by Kobayashi Koichi 9-dan and Hane Yasumasa 8-dan, both making their first appearance in the league, and Yamashiro Hiroshi 6-dan, who fought his way back in after being eliminated in the 4th Meijin league. In the solitary game that has been played to date, Yamashiro defeated Hashimoto Utau on the 6th December.

Incidentally, former Meijin Ishida Yoshio, who was also eliminated in the 4th league, failed to win his way back in.

Kisei Challenger: Hashimoto Shoji or Rin?

Eight players participated in the third stage of the 4th Kisei tournament, with the following

results.

Round One. Rin beat Kato, Otake beat Sato Masaharu, Hashimoto Shoji beat Sakata, Ishii Kunio beat Ishida Yoshio.

Semi-finals. Rin beat Otake, Hashimoto Shoji beat Ishii.

As we go to press the three-game final to decide the challenger is tied 1–1, with Rin having won the first game by 6½ points on the 29th November, but Hashimoto recovering to take the second by resignation on the 6th December. The deciding game will be played on the 20th December.

35th Honinbo League

The four new players in the 35th Honinbo league are Fujisawa Hosai, Shiraishi Yutaka 9-dan (Kansai Ki-in), Cho Chikun, and Kobayashi Koichi, who was eliminated in the 34th league but promptly won his way back in. They join Rin Kaiho, Ishida Yoshio, Takemiya Masaki and Sakata Eio, who retained their places. Sakata has made a good start to the league, beating Cho Chikun and Hosai.

Kato Wins Oza and Tengen Titles

There are no signs yet that the Kato age is coming to a close — in fact his domination of the tournament scene is becoming even more marked, for he now holds four of the top seven titles. Almost before the excitement of the Meijin title match had died down, Kato had added another title to his collection by stripping Ishida Yoshio of the Oza title with two straight wins. He then went on to win the Tengen title match with three straight wins against twenty-one year old Kataoka Satoshi 5-dan. This means that next year as well the go world in Japan is going to revolve around the formidable Kato Masao, Honinbo, Judan, Tengen and Oza.

The results:

27th Oza Title

Game 1 (Oct. 24). Kato (B) won by resignation.
Game 2 (Nov. 7). Kato (W) won by 3½ points.

5th Tengen Title

Game 1 (Nov. 21). Kato (B) won by 4½ points.
Game 2 (Nov. 28). Kato (W) won by resignation.
Game 3 (Dec. 5). Kato (B) won by resignation.

The system of the Tengen title is being changed from the 5th title on. Previously the winner did not defend the title but had to start out again

the following term (Kato is the first to win it for successive terms), but from now on it will follow the same challenger system as the other major titles, so this is a timely win for Kato. During 1980 he will have to make four title defences, but one suspects that his main concern will be with the Gosei, Meijin and Kisei titles which have somehow eluded his grasp.

Further Promotions

There were two promotions of interest in the final rounds of the autumn oteai (rating tournament) at the Nihon Ki-in. Kobayashi Koichi (born 1954) was promoted to 9-dan, thus reaching this rank in the good time of twelve years. His fellow Kitani disciple, Haruyama Isamu (born 1946) won promotion to 8-dan in the very last round. Haruyama is well known to western players through his English language go books and his numerous instruction tours.

2nd World Amateur Go Championship

To date the following national representatives have been decided for the 2nd World Amateur Go Championship, to be held at the Nihon Ki-in in Tokyo from the 25th to the 29th March, 1979.

Europe: Jurgen Mattern, 1979 European Champion

Austria: Helmut Hasibeder

Czechoslovakia: Vladimir Lassak

Denmark: Frank Hansen

F.R. Germany: Bernd Wolter

Holland: Ronald Schlemper

Poland: Janusz Kraszek

Switzerland: Hanspeter Bauman

United Kingdom: Matthew Macfadyen

Yugoslavia: Zoran Mutabzija

(Note: Russia and the German Democratic Republic are not able to participate. These two places have been taken by Denmark and Switzerland.)

Canada: Se-ju Lee

U.S.A.: Kyung Wan Kim, Takao Matsuda, Ned Phipps

Argentina: Fernando Aguilar

Australia: John Power

New Zealand: Graeme Parmenter

Hong Kong: K. Lam

Peoples Republic of China: Liu Hsiao-Kuang, Ch'en Chai-jui, Wang Ch'un (Note: the tournament to decide the Chinese representatives was



Analysing the way Kato won it has become the most familiar scene in tournament go. Here Kobayashi Koichi joins in the discussion of the 2nd Oza game.



Kato's first win in the Tengen title match. To the right of Kato is the referee, Ohira 9-dan, who lost to Kataoka 5-dan in the semifinal. Kataoka made a good start in this game, but was unable to hold on to it in the face of Kato's counterattack.

restricted to players under twenty-six)

Japan: Imamura Fumiaki, Yasunaga Hajime (one more place still to be decided); Tsutsumi Kayoko (1979 Women's Champion)

Otake Reaches Judan Playoff

Otake Meijin has reached the playoff to decide the Judan challenger. On the 14th November he defeated Kudo Norio 9-dan in the winners' section of the tournament and now has to wait to see who wins the losers' section, as the two meet in the playoff.

1979 New Zealand Go Championship

This year's congress was held at Palmerston North in August. The N.Z. Championship was won

Graeme Parmenter 3-dan, so he again becomes New Zealand representative in the world amateur go championship. Second were Ray Tomes 3-dan and Barry Phease 1-dan, both with 3-3 scores.

The Even Game Open Section, a tournament for kyu players, was won by Shuji Takashima 1-kyu of Auckland, with John Blair 1-kyu, also of Auckland, second. The Handicap Tournament was won by Ira Turvey 12-kyu and the Lightning Tournament was won by Bob Talbot 1-dan.

Another regular annual tournament, the Auckland Best Eight League, ended in a tie between Bob Talbot and Ray Tomes, both with 6-1 scores.

2nd South American Go Championship

Eight players — four from Argentina, two each from Brazil and Chile — participated in the 2nd South American Go Championship, held in Buenos Aires from the 21st to the 23rd September. The winner was Fernando Aguilar of Argentina, with Eduardo Lopez Herrero (Argentina) and Franklin Bassarsky (Argentina) coming second and third. Fourth place was taken by Gustavo Flusser of Brazil.

First Finish Go Club

Finland's first go club has been formed in Helsinki and meets every Tuesday from 7 p.m. to 11 p.m. at:

Pokkamonttu

Vanha Poli

Lonnrotinkatu 29

Helsinki.

The chairman is Jaakko Munkki 3-kyu and his address is: Ehrensvarintie 18 — 20 — B — 8

00150 Helsinki 15

1979 Chinese Championship

The 1979 Chinese Championship was held in Peking in September and once again top place was taken by Nieh Wei-p'ing, who seems to be close to invincible in his own country. The placings:

1. Nieh Wei-p'ing
2. Hua I-kang
3. Wang Ju-nan
4. Ch'en Tsu-te

Once again the Women's Championship was won by K'ung Shang-ming, while the fifteen year old genius Ma Hsiao-ch'un won the Junior Championship.

How Strong is Nieh Wei-p'ing?

This is a question which a lot of people would like to know the answer to. The only real way to find out would be to pit him against the top

Japanese players in the newspaper tournaments, but attempts to arrange for Nieh to make a long term visit to Japan have not yet been successful. In the meantime, Nieh has made another short visit to Japan, at the invitation of a Tokyo TV channel and the Nihon Ki-in, the first such special tour by a Chinese player. He played three games in mid-December, with the following results.

1. v. Takemiya 9-dan in a TV haya-go (quick game): Nieh lost by 4½ points.

2. v. Kajiwara 9-dan (sponsored by 'Go Weekly'): Nieh won by resignation.

3. v. Kataoka 5-dan (sponsored by Kido): Nieh lost by ½ point.

We hope to present these games in our next issue.

Nieh's record in official games against Japanese players (excluding haya-go) from 1973 to the present is now 25 wins, 11 losses, 3 jigo. Most of these games have been against 9-dans, whom he has bested by the margin of 15-7, with two jigo. One Japanese professional (an 8-dan) gave as his opinion that while Nieh would not at present make the top ten players, he would definitely make the top twenty (i.e. he would be able to win a title, at least occasionally). The reader can judge the evidence for himself in our next issue.

Major Reform in Nihon Ki-in Rating System

After just over half a century with the old system, the Nihon Ki-in has finally decided to take the plunge and make a wholesale reform in the professional rating system. The current system, which has undergone only slight modifications since being put into effect in 1927, has long been a target of criticism — the system becomes top-heavy, it doesn't reflect current strength, the oteai (rating tournament) is overshadowed by the more glamorous newspaper tournaments. After six years of deliberation, a special committee formed to review the rating system finally came up with an alternative which met with approval from the majority of professionals. The new system will go into effect in spring 1980, though the old system will be kept going parallel for two years before being phased out completely.

The major feature of the old system is that promotion is based on a points system, with the points varying according to the relative ranks of the players and who had which colour. Promotion

Continued on page 37

4th Gosei Title

Cho Chikun has been creating records ever since he came to Japan, winning titles at an age when most players are still trying to qualify as professionals. However, since losing the 25th Oza title match to Kudo two years ago, he has been without a title, though he has kept his place in the Meijin league. This year he has regained top form, recording twenty-nine wins to ten losses up to the end of September. In the Gosei league he faced some tough opposition but pulled off a clean sweep. With Otake Meijin passing through a trough, this was an ideal opportunity to rejoin the ranks of the title-holders.

Game One

White: Otake Hideo, Meijin & Gosei

Black: Cho Chikun 8-dan

komi: 5½; time: 5 hours each

date: 18th July, 1979

Figure 1 (1 – 45)

Black 11. If at 14, White will play 'a'. The cut at 14 leads to a large-scale joseki. Otake says that this is the first time that he has played this joseki – usually he avoids josekis which settle the shape on a large scale.

Black 29. Some professionals felt that Black should throw in a cut at 1 in Dia. 1. The sequence there has appeared in professional play, but Cho commented that he did not want to allow White the good move of 4. Otake agreed that there was




Figure 1 (1 – 45)

Gosei Title-winners

1st (1976): Kato (defeated Otake 3–2)

2nd (1977): Kato (defeated Takemiya 3–0)

3rd (1978): Otake (defeated Kato 3–1)

4th (1979): Cho Chikun (defeated Otake 3–0)

4th Gosei League


	K	H	I	C	S	Score
Kudo	—	1	1	0	1	3–1
Hane	0	—	0	0	1	1–3
Ishida	0	1	—	0	0	1–3
Cho	1	1	1	—	1	4–0
Sakata	0	0	1	0	—	1–3

not much point to the cut.


Black 31. Cho thought for thirty-eight minutes about this move, a large proportion of the limited time allowance in this tournament. Presumably he was considering the possibility of starting a fight in the centre with 1 to 5 in Dia. 2.

White 32 gives Black an excellent answer at 33, a move which works well with Black's centre thickness. Otake commented that he would have got a better result by playing the sequence White 'b', Black 'c', White 'd', Black 'e', before making the approach move at 32.


White 36. If at 1 in Dia. 3, the joseki to 10



Dia. 1



Dia. 2



Dia. 3

follows, giving Black an even better result than in the game. Otake throws in a twist with 36, but Black still gets a very satisfactory result to 45.

Figure 2 (46 – 69)

White has to do something in the centre, so he starts moving out with 46 etc. on the right, then 54 on the left.

White 58 is apparently a slack move, as it lets Black initiate a severe attack with 59 on top, then 61 underneath. Playing 58 at 69 would have forced Black to answer immediately. If Black 'a', White could push up at 59, forcing Black 'b', then connect up with White 'c'.





Figure 2 (46 – 69)




Dia. 4

Cho: 'I wasn't sure what to do if White played 58 at 69. Answering once at 2 in Dia. 4, then attacking with 4 is conceivable. If White comes in with 7, Black answers at 8... Playing this way would have made the game more difficult.'

White 60 makes good shape. If at 67, Black would get another forcing move at 62.

Black 69 shows why White 58 was slack, for it is an ideal attacking move.



The new Gosei




Figure 3 (73 – 100)

Figure 3 (70 – 100)

White 74 etc. White takes the plunge – if these stones die, the game will be over.

Black 79. Filling in a liberty is necessary to prevent White from rescuing two stones with White 85, Black 83, White 84.

White 88. If at 1 in Dia. 5, Black will win the fight with 2 to 8. If next White 'a', Black counters with 'b', White 'c', Black 'd'.

Black 89. This blow at the vital point ensures that Black will win the capturing race.

White 90 weakens Black's centre group, so he reinforces it with 91 to 95.

Black 99 is a good, calm move. If Black played at 1 in Dia. 6, White would counter with 2 to 6, threatening to connect on the edge or to set up a ko.






Figure 4 (101 - 159)



Dia. 5



Dia. 6

Figure 4 (101 - 159)


Black 1 is a good move. Answering at 44 would let White get a good position at the top with 'a'.

White 2. If at 59, Black wins with 'b', White 56, Black 'c'.


White 8. If at 9, Black wins with Black 8, White 'd', Black 56.

Black 13. There is a trap here. If Black plays at 1 in Dia. 7, White counters with 2 to 10 and wins the fight.

White goes through the motions of attacking the black stones at the top, but Black answers carefully and cautiously. After White switches to 28, Black just answers once at 29, then increases his territorial lead with 33 and 35. White takes the last remaining large point with 38, but Black has



Dia. 7



Dia. 8

the tesuji of 43 to look after his group.

White 50. White could get more corner territory with 1 to 5 in Dia. 8, but then Black would capture the key Δ stone with 6.

Black 57 and 59 wrap it up. If White plays 'e' to take away the eye, Black answers at 'c', making miai of 'b' and 'f'.

This was hardly a good game for Otake, but perhaps it's not fair to criticise him, as he played under a handicap. Two days before the game he had had a sudden attack of gout and his leg hurt so much that he thought he would have to forfeit the game. Fortunately, he recovered enough to make the trip to Hiroshima, where the game was played, but he was unable to sit down properly for the game. Under these conditions, one could hardly expect him to play up to his usual standards.

White resigns after Black 159.

Game Two

White: Cho Chikun

Black: Otake Hideo

date: 1st August, 1979




Figure 1 (1 - 39)

Figure 1 (1 – 39)

Otake was completely recovered from his trouble with gout by the time of this game and this was perhaps to be seen in his improved play.

There is little to comment on in the first figure. The combination of White's two three-space pincers is by no means uncommon, though Cho says that this is the first time that he has tried it. Kato was very fond of this pincer five or six years ago.

Figure 2 (40 – 75)

White 44 was the first move to meet with serious criticism. Takemiya, Kobayashi Koichi and Kato were all emphatic that Cho had missed the vital point.

Otake: 'It's just as they say. White 44 is an overplay, going too much for profit. Attacking with White 44 at 57 is the only move. That this is the vital point doesn't brook argument.'

Playing at 57 would obviously have given White the initiative. Black would have to try and settle his group, probably with the sequence 'a', White 'b', Black 'c', White 'd'. Since White's corner invasion ends in gote, Black gets to make an ideal attacking move at 57, building thickness while taking profit.

White 60. Otake was surprised by this move, as approaching Black's strongest position like this is dangerous. He had expected Cho to move out towards the right side, which would have given Black an excellent move at 'e'.

Black 75 is a good point. Black is clearly ahead at this stage.




Figure 2 (40 – 75)





Figure 3 (76 – 120)



Dia. 1

Dia. 2

Figure 3 (76 – 120)


Black 81 – 83. Otake regretted playing these moves, as they strengthened the white group. Instead he should have attacked White's eye-shape with 1 in Dia. 1.

Black 89. Black's aim is to set up a double attack with 99, but this is precisely why helping White to settle his shape with 80 to 82 was a strategic mistake.

White 100, 102. White should omit these moves and play directly at 104, as in that case Black 'a' (which sets up Black 'b') would not be sente.

Black 105. Black 'c' might be better.

Black 109, which lets White make good shape with 110 and 112, seems to be the losing move. Cho had expected Black 1 in Dia. 2. White would counter with the shoulder-hit of 2, but the ensuing fight would be quite troublesome for him. It seems that Otake made a mistake in analysis here, for he had thought that he could counter with 1 in Dia. 3 if White pushed through and cut with 114 and 116.



Dia. 3. If Black 1, White counters with 2 to 6. Black can play 7 etc., but the ladder at 'a' after 13 does not work, because of the $\triangle$ stone, so this sequence is no good. If Black 13 at 'b', then White plays 13 and capturing four stones is not good enough for Black.

Figure 4 (121 – 180)

Black 27. Black could play 1 in Dia.4, saving his corner stones. However, Otake felt convinced that he would lose this way, so he boldly decided to sacrifice the corner group. In exchange he got a solid wall with 29 to 35, which he hoped to use to attack the white group to the left.

Black 43. Attacking with 1 etc. in Dia. 5 does not work, as White can get unconditional life with the sequence to 12.

White 44 is a calm answer to 43. If White blocks at 1 in Dia. 6, his centre group will really be in danger when Black plays 2 to 6.

Black 45, 53. This is the combination Black has been aiming at. Black picks up a lot of additional profit, while White just barely makes





Figure 4 (121 – 180)



his two eyes. Fortunately for White, however, the profit from capturing the group at the top right was sufficient to keep him in the lead. When Black resigns, White even seems to be ahead on the board.

Black resigns after White 180.

Game Three

White: Otake Hideo

Black: Cho Chikun

date: 10th August, 1979

Figure 1 (1 – 42)

Black 9 is the key move of the fuseki. Playing the 'avalanche' (nadare) pattern here works well with the Chinese-style formation on the right. The sequence to 36 is the standard large avalanche joseki when White turns in toward the corner with 18.

White 38. White 39 would also be an excellent move.

Black 41 is a good point, though White can aim at the combination of White 'a', Black 'b', White 'c'.




Figure 1 (1 – 42)





Figure 2 (43 - 87)



Dia. 1

Dia. 2

Figure 2 (43 - 87)

White 46. The usual joseki is to crawl once at 1 in Dia. 1, then to hane at 3, but in this game White does not want to let Black build thickness with 8 and 10.

Black takes up a solid position with 53, then lashes out with 55 when White comes within range. The continuation to 64 is forced.

White 68 secures life for the corner group. If omitted, Black can reduce it to one eye by playing 'a'. However, Black continues with an excellent attacking move at 69, putting the outside group under considerable pressure.

Black 71 revives the threat of 'a'. Living in gote with 72 and 74 is painful for White, as Black gets another good attacking move in the centre at 75. White's position is close to collapse.

Black 87 is a bad mistake which lets White get his group out of trouble. Black should have followed Dia. 2.

Dia. 2. Black 1 here is the vital point. If White 2, Black has a good move at 3. Since Black 'a' is sente, Black's group is safe. If White 2 at 3, Black plays 'b', which means that he could now safely





Figure 3 (88 - 115)

attach at 'c'. Either way White would have great difficulty living with his group in the centre.

Figure 3 (88 - 115)

Black 95. Black is forced to give up the key stones separating the two white groups, which is why Black 87 was a mistake. He is unable to resist with 1 in Dia. 3, as White counters with 2 and 4. Black will lose the capturing race after 6.



Dia. 3

The points that Black loses through this mistake are not important. More significant is the fact that Black loses his attack on the white group, thus losing the overall initiative. Black even has to worry now about the possibility of White's attacking his centre group with 'a'.

Figure 4 (116 - 150)

Black tries to overhaul White in territory, but when White connects up his two groups with 16 to 22, he has the game won.

White 36 is a slack move. Once Black gives atari at 37, White has no choice but to play 38, though the resulting exchange is unfavourable for him. The game is now very close. White 36 should have been at 37.




Figure 4 (116 - 150)




Figure 6 (201 - 245)
40: connects





Figure 5 (151 - 200)



Dia. 4

Figure 5 (151 - 200)

White 70. Saving these stones is not very big. This was White's last chance to try for victory by

cutting at 1 in Dia. 4. The sequence to 10 is one possible continuation. If instead Black 2 at 5, White pushes down at 'a' or plays 'b'. In any case, he should be able to make quite a dent in Black's territory here. Once Black defends with 71, the game is decided in his favour.

Figure 6 (201 - 245)

When White resigns after Black 245, Black seems to be about nine points ahead on the board. The decisive point in this game seems to have been White 36 in Figure 4. Although he still had chances to win after that, Otake seems to have been considerably discouraged by this mistake. As a result, Cho Chikun picked up the Gosei title without dropping a game, something not many fans would have predicted before the title match.



The start of the final game

The Art of Sacrifice

One of the most spectacular fighting techniques in go is the large-scale sacrifice. Such sacrifices are of two main kinds: a calculated strategy, usually early in the game, to gain thickness and influence; an expediency adopted when saving a group of stones under attack looks like proving more trouble than it's worth.

We would like to present some outstanding examples of the art of sacrifice. The most appropriate place to start is with a demonstration by Kajiwara, the prolific inventor of sacrifice josekis, of one way to play a handicap game. Kajiwara always seems to be happiest ridding himself of unwanted encumbrances in his games.

Kajiwara v. Ishida Akira

This game was played in 1966, immediately after Ishida Akira, now 8-dan, made his debut as a professional. He was already regarded as a promising player, so even Kajiwara was obviously going to have a tough time giving him two stones start.

White: Kajiwara Takeo 9-dan

2 stones: Ishida Akira 1-dan

date: 15th July, 1966

Figure 1 (1 – 37)

White 1, 3, 5. A kind of mini-Chinese-style invented by the 4th Honinbo Dosaku (1645 – 1702).

Black 22. Black 35 would be safer. If White 'a', Black plays 'b', White 22, Black 'c'.

Black 27 – 33. Playing these forcing moves before moving out with 35 is typical Kajiwara style. He always tries to extract the maximum potential from a position.

Figure 2 (38 – 73)

White 43 is the vital point, but Black defends skilfully against White's attack. Black 48 is well-




Figure 1 (1 – 37)




Figure 2 (38 – 73)

timed and guarantees Black sente in this fight as White eventually has to come back and save the corner with 65. However, he first sets up a clever squeeze with the sacrifice tesuji of 53.

White seems to be in trouble when Black pushes through and cuts with 68 and 70, but this attack gives Kajiwara the chance to execute a bold sacrifice manoeuvre with 73.

Figure 3 (74 – 100)

Black 82 is timid, as capturing these three stones is not worth much. According to Kajiwara, Black should turn at 'a' with 82.

Getting to defend at 87 means that White's strategy has been a success. Black has to look after his corner group, but when he presses at 92, White seizes the opportunity to launch another large-scale sacrifice operation.

Figure 4 (101 – 150)

Strictly speaking, this may not be an outright sacrifice, as White is left with a ko at 26, but White is not worried about trying to save his




Figure 3 (74 - 100)




Figure 5 (151 - 200)
58: connects; 91: at 74




Figure 4 (101 - 150)

group, as he is satisfied with the wall he has built up on the outside. At this stage the game looks quite promising for White.

Figure 5 (151 - 200)

Black 62. Connecting the ko is after all quite large. The last major fight of the game now begins when White invades the top right corner at 63. The fighting here becomes very complicated, but suffice it to say that the crucial move is White 91. Connecting here is greedy and costs White his chance of winning. He should simply extend at 'a'.

Black 94 decides the game: White cannot attempt to escape with his seven stones here.

Figure 6 (201 - 262)

Black does let the seven stones escape, but only after securing due compensation.




Figure 6 (201 - 262)

46: connects; 56: connects above 20

Kajiwara's aggressive and remorseless play is the highlight of this game, but Ishida Akira should also be commended for standing up to his attack and trading blow for blow. Coping with Kajiwara in full sacrificial fury is no mean feat for a fledgling shodan.

Black won by 4 points.

Jowa v. Nagasaka

The next game we will look at is from early in the career of one of the most powerful fighters of go history, Honinbo Jowa (1787 - 1847). It also features a bold sacrifice strategy of a kind likely to occur to very few players indeed.

Jowa became the 12th head of the Honinbo




Figure 1 (1 - 20)

house in 1827 and succeeded in becoming the 8th and last Meijin godokoro of the Edo period in 1831. Jowa was a late-developer and first made a name for himself by winning a twenty-one game series with Nagasaka Inosuke, a famous amateur player who lived in Tsuruoka in the present Yamagata prefecture. In the Edo period there was no distinction between professional and amateur rankings and Nagasaka had received a 2-dan diploma from the Yasui school, though he was rumoured to be much stronger. This game is the twelfth of their series.

White: Nagasaka Inosuke

Black: Jowa

date: 14th September, 1807




Figure 2 (21 - 66)

Figure 1 (1 - 20)

White 10, 12. For both moves White 'a' seems more urgent.

Black 13. The modern approach would be to make a counter-pincer at 'b'.

Figure 2 (21 - 66)

Black 25. Bad shape but effective.

Black 33 is a good point, giving Black an early edge. With 37 he begins to build up a large moyo.

White 66. As seen with 48 also, Nagasaka's style seems to be to stick close to the opponent, drawing him into hand-to-hand combat. If he had foreseen Jowa's response to his invasion, however, he might have played differently. The sequence White 'a' - Black 'b' - White 'c' is one possibility.





Figure 3 (66 - 73)

Figure 3 (66 - 73)

The magnificent sacrifice sequence from 67 to 73 is based upon profound analysis. Jowa is confident that he can afford to give up the seven-stone group at the top right.

Figure 4 (74 - 100)

White 84. If at 1 in Dia. 1, Black can get a ko with 2 etc.



Dia. 1




Figure 4 (74 - 100)

Black 85 works perfectly with the thickness Black has built up on the right and also defends against a counterattack beginning with White 'a'.

White 86 helps Black. White 93 is better.

Figure 5 (101 - 159)

Black 'a' and 'b' are miai after Black 59, ensuring life for Black's group.

Once Jowa seized the initiative with his sacrifice in Figure 3, he dominated the flow of the game. In this figure he easily crushed the desperate efforts of his opponent to catch up, giving an early glimpse of the fighting power for which he later became so famous.

White resigns after Black 159.




Figure 5 (101 - 159)

Go Seigen v. Kojima

The major breakthrough in the development of modern fuseki theory was brought about by the New Fuseki revolution of the 1930's. New Fuseki upset the classical emphasis on profit and introduced new and systematic theories of central influence and rapid development in the fuseki. The pioneers of this movement were Go Seigen (born 1914) and Kitani Minoru (1901 - 1975). There were many interesting and unusual experiments made during this period. The following game, with its thoroughgoing sacrificial strategy, is a good example.

White: Go Seigen 5-dan

Black: Kojima Shun'ichi 4-dan

date: 17th, 18th October, 1933; played in the autumn rating tournament with no komi




Figure 1 (1 - 50) 50: ko

Figure 1 (1 - 50)

Black 5. Played to prevent Go Seigen from playing sanren-sei, one of the major innovations of New Fuseki, with 'a'.

White 10, 22. The extreme central orientation of moves such as these mark this game as being from the New Fuseki period. Finding ways to deal with moves such as these must have been very perplexing.

White 22 sets up the first sacrifice. Note that Go is not trying to save his corner stones with 24 etc. These moves are a necessary preparation for squeezing with 30 etc.

A favourable ko for Black results, but White gets the outside wall he is after.




Figure 2 (51 - 100)

Figure 2 (51 - 100)

White 58. Not content with giving up the group at the bottom, White prepares to sacrifice another group at the top. The extra moves to 68 are played to ensure that he gets his squeeze on the outside.

White 86. Go Seigen regretted this move. It should be at 'a' or 97.

Figure 3 (101 - 150)

White 2 - 8. It almost comes as a surprise to see White play to live in the corner.

Black 19 is close to being the losing move - Black should capture at 20.

Figure 4 (151 - 200)

Black 51 is the losing move. Black loses sente in the fight which follows 51, so White is able




Figure 3 (101 - 150)




Figure 4 (151 - 200)

58: connects; 76: connects; ko: 83, 86, 89, 92, 95




Figure 5 (201 - 259)

39: connects; 49: ko; Black wins and connects the ko

to defend his centre territory with 74. To have a chance of winning, Black has to play 51 at 'a'.

Figure 5 (201 - 259)

The central influence White gained through his astonishing corner sacrifices provided him with enough territory for a comfortable win. It might be just as well, however, not to take Go Seigen's play in this game as a model, for sacrifices on this scale in the opening are rarely seen in professional play as they put one at a bit too much of a territorial disadvantage. It might take a Go Seigen to get away with it.

White wins by 5 points.

4th Meijin Title

This year's Meijin title promised to be unusually interesting, as it matched two highly contrasting players. Sakata, regarded by many as the greatest player in history, is sharp, aggressive and tenacious, and has a legendary ability to find brilliant moves when he seems to be cornered. Otake is probably the leading exponent of 'aesthetic' go — he values good form and correct style and his play has a characteristic rhythmic flow. In contrast to Sakata, he emphasises thickness and influence rather than profit.

This is the first clash between the two in a two-day game series. Otake has emerged the victor in their previous title matches, winning the 8th Judan title 3–0 in 1969 and the 6th Nihon Ki-in Top Position title 2–1 in 1967, but results from a decade ago have little bearing now. In fact, Sakata was the favourite before the series began, for he has enjoyed excellent form this year (his record to the end of August was 23 wins to 11 losses), while Otake had just lost the Gosei title to Cho Chikun and had a minus record (6 wins, 8 losses). In addition, the challenger always has the advantage of having tuned his play to a fine pitch in the league, while the defender has the handicap of a lack of match practice.

As always happens, however, an extended title series has a momentum of its own which tends to make predictions irrelevant. Otake was suddenly found to be in top form and he matched the

Meijin Title Winners

(sponsor Yomiuri Newspaper)

- 1st Meijin (1962): Fujisawa Shuko
- 2nd (1963): Sakata Eio (won 4–3)
- 3rd (1964): Sakata (defeated Shuko 4–1)
- 4th (1965): Rin Kaiho (won 4–2)
- 5th (1966): Rin (defeated Sakata 4–1)
- 6th (1967): Rin (defeated Sakata 4–1)
- 7th (1968): Takagawa Shukaku (won 4–1)
- 8th (1969): Rin Kaiho (won 4–2)
- 9th (1970): Fujisawa Shuko (won 4–2)
- 10th (1971): Rin (won 4–2)
- 11th (1972): Rin (defeated Shuko 4–2)
- 12th (1973): Rin (defeated Ishida Yoshio 4–3)
- 13th (1974): Ishida (won 4–3)
- 14th (1975): Otake Hideo (won 4–3)

(sponsor Asahi Newspaper)

- 1st (1976): Otake Hideo (defeated Ishida 4–1)
- 2nd (1977): Rin (won 4–0)
- 3rd (1978): Otake (won 4–2)
- 4th (1979): Otake (defeated Sakata 4–1)

challenger in aggressiveness and fighting spirit. Their clash produced a great fighting series.

Game One

White: Sakata Eio 9-dan

Black: Otake Hideo Meijin

komi: 5½; time: 9 hours each

date: 12th, 13th September, 1979; played in Tokyo

Figure 1 (1 – 25). *A nostalgic fuseki*

The pattern to 12 on the right side was very popular a decade ago and was a particular favourite of Sakata's when he had white. One reason it is not seen so often now is that recently Black nearly always plays at least one of his opening moves on the star-point.

Black 15. Another joseki which was very popular a decade ago.

White 24. Perhaps this should be at 1 in Dia. 1, making miai of 2 and 3. White 24, forestalling Black 'a', is always a key point in the pattern on the right, but in this fuseki it seems that Black





Figure 1 (1 – 25)



Dia. 1





Figure 2 (26 - 44)

25 on the left is an even more important point. Black 25 takes the initiative in the game and gives Black an easy fuseki.


Figure 2 (26 - 44). *White falters.*

White 26. White has to defend at the top, but if he plays 28 immediately, Black will get a nice attack going with 'a'. However, Black 27 proves to be a good answer to 26, as it gives Black an excellent continuation at 29, so Sakata commented that he should have just played the ordinary move at 1 in Dia. 2.


Dia. 2. If White 1, Black will probably attack at the top with 2 and 4. White has little choice but to give way up to 11, whereupon Black can switch to the centre, attacking at 12, for example, but this might still be better for White than the result in the game.



Dia. 2



Dia. 3



Dia. 4

White 30 and 32 compare badly in effectiveness with Black 29 and 31. The black stones work well on the outside to reduce the potential of White's right-side moyo, while White's two stones have limited effect on the opponent and do not even completely ensure eye-shape. Black has clearly taken the lead in the fuseki.

Thirty-one moves were played in the three-hour morning session, but the pace of the game slowed down drastically after lunch. Sakata took twenty-three minutes to play 32, then Otake thought for ninety-nine minutes about 33, the slowest move of the game. Sakata then took fifty minutes over 34, so three moves took nearly three hours.

Black 39. The last large point on the fuseki.

Figure 3 (45 - 84). *The lead changes twice.*

Black 45, the sealed move, is bad as it gives White a chance to catch up by invading at 48. Black should have played the forcing sequence in Dia. 3 before 45.

White 68. If at 1 in Dia. 4, Black plays 2. Permitting Black 'a' by answering at White 4 would be unbearable, but if White 3, Black cuts off three stones with 4 to 8.

Black gets an excellent result to 77, thus regaining the lead. Kajiwara commented that Black was nine points ahead on the board at this stage, but Otake more modestly put it at six or seven points.

Figure 4 (85 - 119). *Endgame mistakes*

The endgame is already beginning without any serious fighting having taken place. This kind of




Figure 3 (45 - 84)




Figure 4 (85 - 119)

game is perhaps the most tiring as the players have to recalculate the score after each move.

Black 99. The exchange for 100 is not a gain for Black. He should simply surround the centre with 'a'. This would also leave open the option of peeping at 'b' later.

Black 101. Black 'a' is still better.

Black 107. Attaching at 'c' is better.

White 114. The losing move. Black has made a series of small mistakes, but this decisive error by White makes up for them. White 114 is not very meaningful as Black is open at the top here anyway. It would only make sense as an endgame move if Black already had a stone at 'd'. Instead of 114, White should invade at 'e'. The sequence Black 'f', White 'g', Black 'h' would follow. This would make the game very close, probably half a point either way.

Black 119 shows how meaningless White 114 was. Black would not have got any territory here if White had invaded at 'e'.

Figure 5 (120 - 179). The gap widens.

White 44. Meant to save half a point but actually a two point loss. When Black plays at 1 in Dia. 5, White cannot block at 2 because of the sequence to 9 there. White 44 should be at 'a'.

White 56 is correct. If at 58, Black gains points with 56, followed by 'b'.

White 62 is a tesuji, but it goes to waste when White plays 64. If he pushed through at 1 in Dia. 6, he could pick up a stone in sente, then block at 5. This would make the game much closer.

Black 79. When Otake played here, he felt



Otake plays the sealed move at the start of the second day. Reading out the move is the referee, Hasegawa, hon. 8-dan.






Figure 5 (120 - 179)



Dia. 5



Dia. 6

confident that he had the game won. The fact that Black can now play 'c' in sente shows how trivial capturing 45 was.





Figure 6 (180-220) (100=200)
ko: 102



Dia. 7

Diag. 8 4: connects

Figure 6 (180 – 220). *White slips further back.*

White 92 loses another two points.

Dia. 7. White can play out at 1 here. If Black 4, White extends at 5 and Black has to play a very unfavourable ko. Therefore, instead of 4 —

Dia. 8. Black has to play 1 here, whereupon the sequence to 7 follows. This represents a gain of two points for White.

Black 119. To prevent White 'a', Black 119, White 'b'.

Figure 7 (221 – 252). *Endgame contrasts*

The moves in this figure do not affect the outcome. This game was decided in the endgame, which actually started rather early, and several conspicuous lapses by Sakata cost him what winning chances he had. His mistakes could be put down to time trouble, for he went into byo-yomi on his 146th move, but fatigue probably also played a part. The evening session on the second day of a two-day game seems to be the most crucial as far as stamina is concerned and it was then that a number of his mistakes were made. What-




Figure 7 (221 – 252)

ko: 28, 31, 52; *White wins and connects the ko*.
ever the cause, Sakata's endgame proved to be his Achilles' heel throughout the series. Otake's endgame play, on the other hand, was almost above reproach. It is a characteristic of his thick style of playing that one overhauls the opponent in the endgame, converting one's thickness into points in unexpected places, and this game is a good example. All in all, Otake must have been quite satisfied with this start to the series.

Black wins by 6½ points.

Time taken, White: 8 hours 59 minutes

Black: 8 hours

Game Two

White: Otake Hideo

Black: Sakata Eio

date: 26th, 27th September, 1979

played in Kyoto

Figure 1 (1 – 37). *Otake's careful play*

A surprising feature of this series was that Otake, usually one of the quickest of the top players (together with Shuko), approached the title match with extreme deliberation, even getting into byo-yomi in some of the games, something almost without precedent for Otake. This mood of intense concentration was established immediately in this game, for Otake took nineteen minutes to play his first move, White 2. Undeniably the early moves do determine the basic structure of the game, but there must be a limit to how far one can read ahead (predict?) at the second move, so presumably the main purpose of this period of meditation was to prepare himself mentally for




Figure 1 (1 - 37)

the struggle ahead.

The solid, slow-paced move of White 10 epitomises the Otake style. White is content to let Black dash ahead, developing rapidly, confident that his thickness will let him overhaul the opponent later.

White 12 - 16. Also a leisurely sequence. The alternative is White 'a', Black 'b', White 'c'.


Black 21 - 25. With these moves Sakata completes an enormous moyo based on his favourite Chinese-style fuseki pattern. Note that Black does not make a corner enclosure with 17: the essential point of this fuseki strategy is to entice the opponent into the corner in order to attack and drive him out towards the centre.

Black 31. If at 1 in Dia. 1, White settles his group lightly with 2, which makes miai of 'a' and 'b'.


Black 37. This was the sealed move on the first day, which is an indication of how slow the pace was. The players were just about level in time consumed, with Otake having used four hours exactly to Sakata's four hours six minutes.

Figure 2 (38 - 56). *Advantage Sakata*


White 38. Pushing at 'a' would be a safe move,



Dia. 1



Dia. 2



Dia. 3 5:ko




Figure 2 (38 - 56)

but Otake dislikes dame-filling moves like this.

Black 39 is the vital point, giving Black an excellent continuation at 43. The latter move puts White on the spot, as shown by the fact that Otake took one hour sixteen minutes to decide on 46. Instead of making bad shape with 46, White would like to be able to play at 1 in Dia. 2, but there is no way for him to get a satisfactory result in the fight that follows after Black cuts with 2 and 4.

The result to 47 is favourable for Black. Going back a bit, this probably means that White should have tried something different with 36 in Figure One, though just what is not easy to say. One alternative is using 36 to attach at 37, while Kajiwara advocated sliding along the side on the second line, one space to the right of 37. The ensuing variations are unlimited, of course, so it is not possible to give a definite conclusion.

Black 51 is a surprising move, as the 'joseki' in this position is to give way with 1 and 3 in Dia. 3, which would preserve more of Black's moyo. White could attach at 4 next, but Black could counter with 5 and 7, then drop back at 9. Sakata must have had his reasons for rejecting this response, but the result to 54 in the Figure,




Figure 3 (57 – 80)

76: connects

with a hole opening in the side of Black's moyo, seems reasonable for White. Another possibility for 51 is dropping back at 'b' in the Figure, but presumably this kind of move goes against the grain for Sakata.

Figure 3 (57 – 80). Fighting starts.

Black 57. Now we see why Black wanted to play 53. A more peaceful approach would be to play 57 at 64, but the aggressive move of 57 is more typical of Sakata's style.

Black 65. To help defend against White 73.


White 68 is large: it not only threatens Black's group but also defends against an invasion at 'a'.

White 70. White 'b' at the bottom is also a very attractive point, but White decides to play 70 before Black gets a chance to play 1 and 3 in Dia. 4. After 3 there, Black 'a' would be sente, so Black could answer White 'b' with 'c', getting quite a lot of territory at the top.

Black 79. Black is trying to settle both his groups at the same time. If White simply connects at 'c', Black will defend at 'd', so White throws in a twist with 80.

Figure 4 (81 – 131). Regrets on both sides

Black 81, 85. Very determined moves: Black



Dia. 4

Dia. 5





Figure 4 (81 – 131)

has to guard against White 'a', though usually helping the opponent to split up one's own forces, as with 84 and 86 here, is taboo. Black is satisfied with living in sente with 87, for he takes the lead when he switches to 89.

Black 93. Otake expected 1 and 3 in Dia. 5, but Sakata preferred the continuation at 95.

Black 103. Black would like to be able to secure his side territory by playing at 1 in Dia. 6, but instead of docilely connecting at 10 White would launch a severe attack with 2 etc. Permitting this would be unbearable for Black.



Dia. 6

Black 107. Sakata regretted this move, which he said was bad style. If he had played 107 at 108, he would not have had to worry about White's exploiting the weaknesses in his shape with 112 and 124.

Otake had his regrets too. He commented that once having played 114 and 116 at the bottom, he should have continued by playing 122 at 'b'. If Black then captured 118, White could next surround the centre with 'c', with good prospects of winning. Black 23 not only makes it difficult for White




Figure 5 (132 – 200)

94: connects

to get points in the centre but also weakens the white group to the right.

Figure 5 (132 – 200). White's 'losing move'

Black 33 – 37. Taking this profit is Black's privilege, guaranteed since the fuseki.

White 38. Otake went into byo-yomi on this move.


Black 47. Simply connecting at 66 would have made it very difficult for White to win.

White 50. This is White's chance – if he can take sente in the fight here, then switch to 66, he can win.

Black 51. Sakata joined Otake in byo-yomi.

White 72. This should have been the losing move for White, as permitting Black 81 and 83 (these moves are reverse sente) is a serious loss. Instead of 72 –

Dia. 7. White must play 1 here, as the sequence to 7 is sente and gains two points for White while reducing Black's area by two points. Since White also gains thickness in the centre, his overall gain would be a good five points, which would of course ensure him a win.



Dia. 7




Figure 6 (201 – 246)

ko (at 17): 20, 23, 26; 28: at 17; 30: retakes. Black connects 21 and White connects 2.

Figure 7 (201 – 246). Black's losing move

Black 15 is the decisive mistake which costs Sakata the game. White 16 is the winning move: this is the last three-point move on the board – all the remainder, and 15 as well, are worth two points or less. Despite the pressure of playing a move a minute Otake realised that he would lose if he connected at 17 and also realised that he had enough ko threats to win the ko at 17. When he switched to 16, he knew that this gave him the game by half a point. Despite his chagrin at losing a game which had mainly been favourable for him, Sakata could not help expressing his admiration after the game for this marvellous feat of analysis – or intuition.

White wins by ½ point.

Time taken. White: 8 hours 59 minutes

Black: 8 hours 59 minutes



Winning the half-pointer is what counts


Game Three

White: Sakata Eio

Black: Otake Hideo

date: 3rd, 4th October, 1979

played at Izu Nagaoka



Dia. 1

Dia. 2




Figure 1 (1 - 31)

Figure 1 (1 - 31). A tight beginning

Black 1, 3 and 5 are the Shusaku fuseki and White 4 and 6 were the most popular responses in the Edo period, though of course White did not start with a stone on the 3-3 point. Black 7 at 10 would be faithful to the classical pattern, but this move is considered too slow for komi go. The severe pincer of 7, in contrast, exemplifies the unrelenting spirit of modern go.

Black 9 seems dubious, as White's continuation to 12 nullifies the effect of 7. One of the ordinary joseki moves, at 10, 12 or 13, seems preferable.

The same severe pincer appears in the bottom left with 15. Otake is playing a very tight game, as seen in the diagonal move at 19. Black 'a' would conclude the joseki to the left, but Black does not want to let White press down on him with White 19.

White 22. White 'b' at the top would be a very large point. If Black made a hane at 1 in Dia. 1, White could cope with 2 to 6. White purposely defers to Black the responsibility for determining the direction of the fuseki with his next move.

Black 23. Otake first thought of Black 'c', but this would give White a good answer at 26, making miai of 'd' and 'e'.





Figure 2 (32 - 49)

Black 31 was the last move on the first day. Sakata's sealed move took everyone by surprise.


Figure 2 (32 - 49). Intriguing developments

White 32. Most people expected White to play at the bottom right, the standard sequence White 47, Black 'a', White 'b' being one possibility. However, Sakata felt that his two stones there were in no immediate danger, so he decided to strengthen his group at the top. White 1 in Dia. 2 is usually correct shape, but here it would only give Black a good attacking move at 2.

Black 33 is forced: if omitted, in favour of Black 1 in Dia. 3, for example, White has a clever placement in the corner at 2. Black cannot intercept with 3 because White counters with 4 to 8. If next Black 'a', then White 'b', Black 'c', White 'd', winning the fight. Black would therefore



Dia. 3



Dia. 4


have to let White connect underneath at 3.

The result to 38 seems acceptable for both: White swallows up a black stone, securing his group, but Black expands his moyo on the right side.

Black 41 – 45. The fighting here is very difficult. When Black attaches at 41, his concern is really with the two white stones to the right. The usual way of attacking these stones would be with 1 in Dia. 4. The continuation to 9 is likely, but presumably this result did not appeal to Otake.

White 44. White 'c' would be the worst move, giving Black good forcing moves at 'd' and 44, after which he would play 45.

Black 45. Moving out at the bottom with 1 to 5 in Dia. 5 does not work well because of White 6. After Black 'a', White 'b', Black 'c', White would have an ideal move at 'd'.



Dia. 5

When Black plays 45, the sequence in Dia. 5 becomes a real threat, but White resolutely jumps in at 46. Black then takes a firm grip on the two white stones with 47, but in exchange White is satisfied with further reducing the corner with 48. With this exchange here, after the surprising development at the top, this game is acquiring quite an unusual flavour.

Figure 3 (50 – 80). *Otake begins to go astray.*

Black 57. Necessary to prevent White 'a'.

White 60, 62. If omitted, Black will play 1 in Dia. 6, a large move in itself, with the threat of Black 'a', White 'b', Black 'c' to come.

Black 63 met with criticism, as the exchange for 64 helps to dissolve White's anxieties about his bad aji in this area. There is no hurry to play 63, for since White is aiming at attacking at 74, he is hardly going to help Black strengthen the corner by making a hane at 'b'. Shimamura 9-dan suggested attaching at 'c' with 63 (Black should have no trouble living there), while Takagawa recommended building up Black's moyo with Black 70, White 'd', Black 'e'.

Black 67. Answering on top at 70 also seems possible.





Figure 3 (50 – 80)



Dia. 6

White 74. The last large point on the board.

Black 77 – White 78. This exchange is bad for Black, as he loses his eye-shape in the corner. He should omit 77 and block at 79 immediately.

Figure 4 (81 – 100). *Diversions attacks*

Black complicates the position with his jabs at 81 and 83, but he is handicapped in any fighting by the time-bomb ticking away in the bottom left corner. However, up to 97 he does build some useful thickness, thus covering the basic weakness in his position for the time being.




Figure 4 (81 – 100)




Figure 5 (101 - 132)

Figure 5 (101 - 132). Sakata's parachute drop

White 10. If at 12, Black will play a ko with Black 10, White 'a', Black 'b'.

When Black gets sente to play 11, the game looks very promising for him, but this move only sets the scene for a Sakata brilliancy. White boldly parachutes into the middle of the vast black moyo with 14 and this stone cannot be caught.

Black 17. With the benefit of hindsight, Otake commented that answering at 1 in Dia. 7 would have been safer. The sequence to 9 would follow and this would give Black a small but solid win.

Black 21. Black has no choice: he has too few liberties to try Black 1 in Dia. 8. White would counter with 2 to 8, then if Black 'a', White 'b' and vice versa, the choice for Black being one between a major and a minor disaster.




Figure 6 (133 - 168)

66: connects

Figure 6 (133 - 168). Sudden death


White 34. Sakata went into byo-yomi on this move. Once again Otake had preceded him, running out of time on 23 in Figure 5.

Black 53, preventing White 'a', is the largest point and gives Black a small lead.

Black 59 is the first losing move. If Black had played Black 'b', Black 34, then secured his eyes in the corner with Black 60, he would have won by one and a half points.


Otake looked startled when Sakata came into the corner at 60 — he had obviously not analysed this move at all. In his surprise he made the fatal mistake with 61 and in a flash the game was over.

Black has to resign after White 68 — if he connects at 1 in Dia. 9, White has no trouble reducing him to one eye with 2 to 8. If Black had played ▲ (Black 67) at 'a', he could at least have got a ko with 'b', though the game would still have been lost.




Dia. 7

Dia. 8



Dia. 9



Dia. 10 20: connects

After the game Shimamura 9-dan, the official referee, pointed out that Black could have survived White's sudden attack at 60 by countering at 1 in Dia. 10. The continuation is rather lengthy, but after playing all the forcing moves he can, Black could go back and get two eyes in the corner with 21. The subsequent endgame play hypothesised here would give Black a win by half a point.

However, credit should not be taken away from Sakata. Both sides were playing at a minute a move and Sakata had been aiming at this group for some time. Moreover, it was his marvellous tesuji of 14 in Figure 5 which kept him in the game and thus, however indirectly, helped make this denouement possible.

Black resigns after White 168.

Time taken. White: 8 hours 59 minutes

Black: 8 hours 59 minutes

Game Four

White: Otake Hideo

Black: Sakata Eio

date: 17th, 18th October, 1979

played in Sapporo

Figure 1 (1 – 35). *A fighting start*

White 14. The simple extension to 14 is fairly unusual, though it is given in Ishida's 'Dictionary of Basic Joseki' (Vol. I, p. 171). White usually forces with 1 in Dia. 1 before extending.

Black 15. Sakata commented that this might be a new move. After 17 Black can aim at White's weak point of 'a'. If Black omits 15, switching elsewhere, White will later play 1 in Dia. 2, aiming at sealing Black in with 'a'.

Black 19 can be seen as inviting the invasion






Figure 1 (1 – 35)



Dia. 1




Dia. 2

at 22, as Black could play 'b', then extend at 21, if he wanted to prevent it.


Black 23. Black has little choice, as attaching on top at 1 in Dia. 3 does not work well. White can crawl at 2 and 4, then counter Black 5 with 6 and 8. After White 10, Black would be in trouble.

White 26 is aggressive – the safe move is 'c'.

Black 29, before White gets a chance to jump to 'd', is a well-timed forcing move, but Black should leave it at that. Capping at 1 in Dia. 4 with 31



Dia. 3



Dia. 4

would be an excellent move which would make it very difficult for White to do anything with his solitary stone. White could easily live with 2 to 8 if he wanted to, but this would make Black 9 sente, after which Black could pull out his stone at the top with 'a'.

Black 35. Black 1 in Dia. 4 would still be better.




Figure 2 (36 – 56)

Figure 2 (36 – 56). *He who hesitates –*

White 36 was the sealed move on the first day. Sakata had once again played the fuseki very slowly and had used four hours forty-four minutes to Otake's two hours twenty-nine minutes. Sakata was dogged by time trouble throughout this series.


Black 37. Connecting would make Black a little heavy. White would answer by jumping out lightly to 56.

White 38 is the vital point – if White does not play here, Black certainly will. Black 39 makes bad shape, but Black must resist.


White 42 is an unrelenting move. Sakata apparently expected the more peaceful move of 1 in Dia. 5. White could settle his group up to 7, then aim at White 'a'.

White 44. White 1 in Dia. 6 is also possible. Black would secure his group with 4, after which the game would be decided by the fighting in the centre (White 5 might be at 'a'). However, Otake does not like to create floating groups.

The result to 52, with White settling his group and laying waste to the side, seems to make the game a little favourable for White. Black 31 is



Dia. 5



Dia. 6

to blame for this.

Black 53 seems natural, as it is the largest point on the board. However, Black should first have played a forcing move at 'a'. It seems that Sakata held it in reserve because he was considering the possibility of Black 'b' instead, but his hesitation gave Otake a chance to seize the initiative with a blow at the vital point with 56.

Figure 3 (57 – 80). *First blood to White*

Black 57. Black 58 is safer but too passive.

White 58 is an excellent cut. Black cannot give atari at 66 because of White 59.

White 60 is a superb continuation and is the reason White did not answer Black 57 at 61. If Black plays 1 in Dia. 7, White 2 would automatically give White a connection on the edge, while also making miai of 'a' and 'c'. White 'a'—Black 'b' would put the corner into ko, but if Black defended at 'b', White would split Black into two weak groups with 'c'.






Figure 3 (57 – 80)



Dia. 7




Dia. 8


Black 61 is a mistake, as Black should play immediately at 1 in Dia. 8. The sequence to 13 would follow (White 10 is necessary to prevent Black 'a', White 'b', Black 'c'), but this would be better for Black than the actual result. The difference in the game is that Black has exchanged 61 for 64, not so bad in itself perhaps, but then he has compounded the error by exchanging 'd' and 'e' for White 'f' and 'g', a straight-out loss of five points, not to mention the thickness accruing to White. Sakata was disgusted with his play here and lamented that he had lost almost the equivalent of a full move.

Black 65. Dia. 9 shows that Black would lose if he tried to make a fight of it. The result here, an approach-move-ko, is hopeless for Black. However, if the exchange of Black 'a'—White 'b' has been made first, the result would be a ko favourable for Black. For this reason White does not answer Black 65 but switches to 66 in the centre — if he cannot catch the group at the top, he'll try to catch the centre group. Since Black must defend at 71, White succeeds in his objective.


Black 73 and 75 are of course meaningless — since Black has to live with 77 and 79 anyway, these moves should be omitted. After White 80



Dia. 9



Dia. 10



Dia. 11

the game looks lost for Black.




Figure 4 (81 – 107)

Figure 4 (81 – 107). *Black counterattacks.*

Black 81, 85. Black attempts to surround the top on the largest scale possible — he has to, to get back into the game.

Black 93. If at 94, Black has no answer to White 93.

White 96 is the wrong peep — correct is White 1 in Dia. 10. Black would answer at 2, as connecting with 5 would let White seal in the whole group, so White would pick up a stone with 3 and 5, for a satisfactory result. White 96 permits a violent counterattack which throws the position into confusion again.

The sequence from 101 to 107 is a one-way street.

Black 105, anticipating a capturing race, is to restrain White from playing 'a'.

Black 107. If at 1 in Dia. 11, Black can live with 5 and 7, but this would simplify the game, leaving only endgame moves. Black has to play more aggressively if he wants to catch up.





Figure 5 (108 - 144)



Dia. 12

Figure 5 (108 - 144). *Psychologically out-manoevred?*

The game would be over if White could play at 1 in Dia. 12, but when Black counters with 2 to 12, White loses the capturing race. White therefore has no choice but to cut at 8, though the resulting exchange of groups is a little unfavourable for him.

Black 11 - 15. Once again Black tries to take the right side on as large a scale as possible. The fate of White 16 will decide the game.

White 24. There are two ways of looking at this move. Theoretically speaking, it is bad as it fills White's own liberties and makes the placement at 27 possible. Judging from the result in the game, however, White 24 could be seen as a clever psychological ploy, as it entices Black into making an all-out attack with 27 and 31 which has the ironical effect of hastening his own defeat.

Black 31. With the advantage of hindsight, it is clear that Black should have played more patiently, answering White 28 at 32. White would secure life with White 'a', Black 'b', White 'c', whereupon Black could attach at 'd' at the bottom. This would prolong the game, so Black might get a chance later on to catch up.




Figure 6 (145 - 168)

White 42 is a clever move. Black 43 at 44 would just help White to make eye-shape with 'e'. Black cannot hope to catch White after 44.

Figure 6 (145 - 168). *Mopping up*

Black finally seems to get White boxed in with 45, but White now delivers the coup de grace with 48. If Black tries to resist with 1 in Dia. 13, White counters with 2 to 6, making miai of 'a' and 'b'.


Sakata used up the last of his time on 49. This move leads to another exchange, but one very profitable for White, as the stones he gave up before come back to life, bringing captives with them to boot.

White 62. This stone cannot be caught, so Black finally has to throw in the towel. The game has been a disaster for him from start to finish.

Black resigns after White 168.

Time taken. White: 7 hours 3 minutes

Black: 8 hours 59 minutes



Dia. 13

Michael Redmond in the Insei League

In our previous issue we reported on the encouraging progress of sixteen year old Michael Redmond of Santa Barbara, who has been playing in the insei league at the Nihon Ki-in for two years. Michael has continued to do well and at the beginning of December moved up to sixth place in the league, which has fifty-eight members. If he continues to improve at this rate, it should not be very long before he follows in the footsteps of Manfred Wimmer of Austria (2-dan at the Kansai Ki-in) and James Kerwin of the U.S. (1-dan at the Nihon Ki-in) and becomes the third western professional. To give readers an idea of what the competition is like on the threshold of the professional go world, we present some of Michael's recent games from the insei league.

Game One

White: Michael Redmond (then no. 9)

Black: Kuboniwa (no. 8)

komi: 5; time: 1½ hours each, no byo-yomi

date: 4th November, 1979

Figure 1 (1 – 50)

Black 15. Black 'a' is usual, but White did not like the prospect of White's invading next at 30.

Black 23 is too passive — he should push up at 41.

White 38. White must first play 39, forcing Black to answer at 'b'. If Black later pushed up from 'b', White could easily secure a connection with White 41, Black 'a', White 50.




Figure 1 (1 – 50)

White 40. Pulling out his three stones would only make White heavy and give Black a good target for attack.

Black 43. Cutting to the left of 42 is too small. White would happily sacrifice these stones.

White 48 is a good point, but reinforcing at 'c' has greater priority. White is in trouble when Black attacks at 49, for this is the vital point and ensures Black a good result in the ensuing fighting.




Figure 2 (51 – 100)

59: connects

Figure 2 (51 – 100)

When the dust settles after the exchange to 63 Black 49 in Figure 1 is still a thorn in White's side.

Black 67 is the losing move: at one stroke Black lets slip his advantage. This must be at 68, keeping up the pressure on White's group. If White cut at 71, Black could counter with 67, White 'a', Black 'b'. White 68 to 76 considerably strengthen White's centre group.

White 78 and 80 are stylish moves, building up White's right side moyo while also offering assistance to his centre group.

Black 93 to 99. Black gains nothing from this squeeze, as White's centre group is not endangered.

Figure 3 (101 – 140)

Black 5. Black should secure his base with 1 in Dia. 1. If White 2, Black plays 3 in sente, as White has to play 4 to prevent Black from killing him with 'a'. Black could then play elsewhere





Figure 3 (101 - 140) 33: ko



Dia. 1 5 elsewhere

with 5. If White 6, Black answers with 7 and 9. White would not continue with 10 unless he had a chance of killing the whole group, for Black can take sente with 13, which also adversely affects White's area to the right.


Black 7 is a slip, as Black cannot resist White 8. Black 7 should be at 10.

White 14 should be at 15.


Black 25 is another mistake as Black can live outright with 1 in Dia. 2. The sequence to 9 there gets one eye and makes miai of a second at 'a' or 'b'.

Dia. 3. White cannot resist with 2 and 4 — Black wins the fight with 5.

Black's mistake with 25, letting White get a ko with 26 etc., turns the game decisively in



Dia. 2



Dia. 3




Figure 4 (141 - 188)

79: below 60; 81: captures two stones

White's favour. Black easily has enough ko threats to win the fight, but a peaceful threat like 34 is good enough for White.

Black 37 is too loose as it gives White the tesuji of 38. Black should play solidly at 'a', which White would answer at 'b'. Black 'c' next would be very big, though playing at 'd' would give White a good game. However, this would still be better for Black than the result in the game.

Figure 4 (141 - 188)

Black attacks desperately in this figure, but the game is past saving. Getting one eye puts White ahead in the fight in the top right corner and he also rescues his centre group. When White played 68, he read out the sequence to 82 and thus assured himself of victory.

White 80. If White captures 79, then Black plays 80, White connects, Black 'a', White 'b', Black 82, thus killing White by reducing him to one large eye (gomoku-nakade).

White 82. Also to prevent gomoku-nakade.

Black resigns after White 188.

Game Two

White: Michael Redmond

Black: Hagiwara

date: 28th October, 1979

Figure 1 (1 - 50)

White 14 is a mistake in direction: it should be at 18 or 33.

Black 17 fails to take full advantage of White's mistake. The best course for Black is to push up




Figure 1 (1 - 50)





Figure 2 (51 - 108)



Dia. 1

with 1 and 3 in Dia. 1, then defend at 5. White's next move would be very difficult. If he extended at 'a', Black could build up his moyo with 'b', but if instead he tried to gouge out the moyo with 'c', he would be in for a hard fight.

White 30 could also be at 'a', in which case Black 'b', White 'c', Black 30 would follow. This would give Black good shape, so White preferred 30.

White 32. Again a mistake in direction — 33 is bigger. White has got off to quite a bad start.

White 42 is too slow and defensive. Fujisawa Shuko suggested White 'd', while Iwamoto 9-dan suggested taking sente with White 'e'—Black 'f', then switching elsewhere.

White 46. White is behind, so he must start a fight.

Figure 2 (51 - 108)

White 52. White loses a tempo — he should simply extend at 54. If Black pushed up at 52, this would help White, but if instead Black played 55, White would then be able to go as far as 57

(note that in this case White would never exchange 52 for 53). In the game Black is able to seal White in nicely with 57.

Black 59, however, is probably a worse mistake than 54. Black should jump to 'a', keeping up the pressure on White and also aiming at his group at the top. Black 59 cedes the initiative to White, giving him a chance to get back into the game by attacking at 60.


White 72. If White 'b', Black 'c': this would keep the game simple, which would be to Black's advantage, as he is still ahead.

Black 73. If at 1 in Dia. 2, White captures with 2 to 6.


White 74. If White 75, then Black 74, simplifying again. After 72, the exchange to 77 is best for White, though Black still retains his lead.

White 92 is meaningless, as it helps Black while doing nothing for White. From the professional viewpoint, this was probably White's worst move.

White 100. White should play at 103 at the top and let his group at the bottom take its chances. It is unlikely that Black could kill it, though as a life-and-death problem it is too difficult to



Dia. 2



Dia. 3

give a definitive answer.

Black 101 is bad, as White welcomes the chance to get rid of his bad aji with 102. Black misses his chance to wrap up the game here. Instead of 101 —

Dia. 3. Black should simply jump out at 1. White has such bad aji at the top that he would probably capture at 'a' anyway (in which case Black would never continue with 'b', though this gives the same result as 101 to 103 in the game). Black could then play 'c' for a comfortable win. If instead White attacked with 2, Black could play 3 to 7 in sente, force with 9 (Black 'a' would also be possible, though extremely complicated), then finish off with 11, again setting up a sure win.

The result to 108 makes the game close, though Black still has a small lead. Thereafter, Black made a number of mistakes in the endgame, so White was finally able to come out on top.

Moves after 108 omitted.

White wins by two points.

Game Three

White: Michael Redmond

Black: So

date: 8th September, 1979

Figure 1 (1 – 50)

Black 27. There is no justification for this move: it helps White to repair a defect in his shape, yet is not necessary for Black to live in the corner.

Black 37 could also be at 'a', in which case White 'b', Black 'c', White 37 would follow. Black preferred to go for central thickness with 37.

Black 47. Black should follow joseki by pressing at 'd'. White would answer at 'e', after which Black could play 'f'.




Figure 1 (1 – 50)




Figure 2 (51 – 100)

97: connects

Figure 2 (51 – 100)

White 80 leaves White with a thin position. Reinforcing in the centre with 'a' is better.

White 88 is a bad mistake as it gives Black a forcing move at 'b' which would have an adverse effect on the eye-shape of the white group below. White 88 must be at 'c'.

Black 95 should be at 96. White 98, Black 99, White 'd', Black 'e' would follow, giving Black much better shape than he gets in the game.

Figure 3 (101 – 150)

White 32 should be at 'a'.

White 42 is a bad mistake in timing. White should first play at 1 in Dia. 1; if Black 2, he






Figure 3 (101 - 150)
8: connects



Dia. 1



Dia. 2 9: connects

can live with 3 and 5. If Black plays 'a' instead of 2, White can play 'b', getting a better result than in the game.

Figure 4 (151 - 200)

Black 51. Black misses a chance to kill White with the sequence in Dia. 2.

White 60 should be at 62, as the additional forcing move at 61 helps Black in the centre.

Black 83 threatens to cut off White's centre group with Black 'a'. White 84 defends against this tesuji while in turn threatening Black's centre stones. If Black defends with 1 in Dia. 3, White 2 nullifies Black 'a' and makes miai of 87 and 88 ('b' and 'c' in the diagram).


White 86. Not at 99 if White wants to survive — Dia. 4 shows why.

Black 89 is bad — the proper move is Black 90.


Figure 5 (201 - 250)

Black 1. Black should play 1 in Dia. 5 (over page). If White 2, Black kills White with 3 and 5. If White plays 2 at 5, Black then kills the bottom group with Black 2, White 'a', Black 'b', White 'c', Black 'd'.

Black 21 is terrible. The sequence in Dia. 6



Dia. 3



Dia. 4




Figure 4 (151 - 200)






Figure 5 (201 - 250)

(over page) would give Black a five or six point win.


Black 23 is the losing move: Black should play




*Tripods
(Surikku Tripods)*



*Binoculars
(Kamakura Koki)*



*Screw-driver sets
(Niwa Works)*



*Locks
(Nagazawa Works)*



*Leather goods
(Konoike Works)*



*Garden sprays, lubricators
(Furupura)*

Nature and Industry in Saitama Prefecture

Saitama Prefecture is located in the centre and the western part of the Kanto Plain which is right in the middle of the Japanese archipelago. It is an inland prefecture with an area of approximately 3,799 sq.km. and a population of about 5,310,000. Its main topographical divisions are a mountainous western district, a central tableland and a southern plain.

Part of the mountainous western district is designated as a national park and it includes a series of 2,000 m. mountains. The Arakawa River, which has its source in these mountains, flows into the central area of the prefecture, passing through the Chichibu Basin and the famous sightseeing site Nagatoro on the way.

A vast fertile plain, bounded by two great rivers, the Tone River and the Arakawa River, extends from the east to the west and since ancient times this area has been famous as the granary of the capital. Nowadays this part of the prefecture, especially the southern part is the area which has been most drastically urbanised.

Under these favourable geographical conditions, with a rich natural environment and with its southern area adjoining the capital Tokyo, various industries have shown striking development. Formerly agriculture


took pride of place, but since around 1960 the heavy chemical industries have developed rapidly, so that now Saitama is one of the leading industrial prefectures of the nation. According to the 1978 Saitama Prefecture Industrial Survey, there are now 33,799 manufacturing enterprises with a total production value of seven trillion four hundred and thirty nine billion yen. Of particular note is the production of transportation equipment, which comes to 16.4% of the total. Electrical equipment is 12.2%, and general equipment is 8.6%. The heavy chemical industries production comes to 64.8% of the total.

Many famous companies are included among the manufacturers of the prefecture, but the majority are small to medium enterprises. These companies produce goods which are in no way inferior to those of the large manufacturers.

The creativity of the goods produced in Saitama Prefecture and the rich local colour resulting from the long historical background of the region have done much to enhance the reputation of Saitama as an industrial prefecture. We fully expect that these enterprises will adapt successfully to the severe economic conditions hereafter and continue to develop new techniques and new products.

*Enquiries: Market Expansion Officer Commerce and Tourism Section
Saitama Prefecture Department of Commerce and Industry
3-15-1, Takasago, Urawa City
Saitama Prefecture
Tel. 0448-24-2111, Ext. 2752*

SAITAMA PREFECTURE



Dia. 5

Dia. 6

immediately at 29. The continuation White 30, Black 31, White 23, Black 'a' would give a very close game.

After this there were small mistakes on both sides but Black 23 was the crucial error which decided the game in White's favour.

Figure 6 (250 – 304)

White was skating on thin ice for much of this game, with various groups up for grabs at one time or another, but fortunately for him Black




Figure 6 (251 – 304)

ko: 57, 60, 63, 66, 69, 72, 75, 78, 81, 84, 87, 90
92: connects; 104: connects at 61

missed all his chances to land a knockout punch.
White wins by four points.

Go World News (continued from page 4)


takes place when a player scores a certain minimum average over a sequence of a set number of games. Since the sequence can be calculated from any point the player chooses, one good spell can make up for a long period of mediocre results. To take an extreme case, an 8-dan could lose every game for a decade, but then earn promotion to 9-dan if he had good results for two or three years.

The key feature of the new system is that there will be demotion as well as promotion. Every Nihon Ki-in player, except for the 9-dans (who initially at least will not participate in the system) will be ranked from 1 to 200 (approximately). The top twenty players will play eight games a year in the All Japan Section, while the remainder


will play ten a year in the Western (Osaka and Nagoya – about 60 players) and Eastern (Tokyo – about 120) Sections. Half a player's games will be with white and half with black and there will be no komi. Promotion, or demotion as the case may be, will be decided once a year, after all the games have been played. Only one player a year will be promoted to 9-dan, while the other dan ranks will be decided by the placings (for example, 1st place=9-dan, 2nd to 10th=8-dan, 11th to 23rd=7-dan, etc). We hope to report on the system in more detail once it starts up, but one thing can be safely predicted: with such a precise ranking system, interest in the oteai is certainly going to revived.

Basic Fighting Techniques


Miyazawa Goro



Problem One
White to play



Problem Two
White to play



Problem Three
White to play

Pattern Four: The Cut

The cut may seem to be a very simple concept, but the correct use of it can often be quite difficult. It is a very flexible tesuji which can serve a variety of purposes, quite apart from the simple but effective one of splitting the opponent's forces.






Illustration One: White to play




Dia. 1

Dia. 1. White 1 is the only way to win the fight. It slows down the opponent by preventing him from giving atari.




Dia. 2

Dia. 2. As he can't give atari on either side, Black has to capture with 2 and 4, but this gives White time to win the capturing race.




Problem One. White to play

Problem One (6-kyu). White to play and save his four stones (assume that any ladders are favourable for White).



Dia. 1: wrong




Dia. 2: correct

Dia. 1. Cutting at 1 is a good start, but White obviously does not have time to extend at 3.


Dia. 2. The tesuji is to throw in a second time at 3.

Dia. 3. Black is forced to play 4 and 6, so White can set up a ladder, saving his four stones.


Dia. 4. If Black 2, White plays 3 and saves his stones in sente, as Black has to play 'a' to live in the corner.



Dia. 3




Dia. 4




Problem Two. White to play

Problem Two (5-kyu). White to play. Can he save the group at the top?


Dia. 1. The simple atari at 1 is useless: Black 2 makes miai of 3 and 4. White 1 at 2 is no better.



Dia. 1: wrong



Dia. 2: the tesuji



Dia. 3

Dia. 2. The breakthrough comes when White hits upon the idea of cutting at 1. Black cannot link up ▲ after 3, so the white stones at the top come back to life.

Dia. 3. Black 2 doesn't help, as White strikes from the other side with 3. This time Black cannot link up ▲.






Illustration Two: Black to play

In this problem Black's first two moves are important.

Dia. 1. Making a cut at 1 is obvious. The important thing is to play next at 3 — this is the vital point.




Dia. 1



Dia. 2

Dia. 2. Black 1 next is sente — White has to answer at 'a'. If he resists with 'b', he only gives Black a good move at 'c'. Note that Black could also play 1 at 'd' — whichever way he plays here, he gets a thick position.


Dia. 3. If White answers at 2, Black is happy to pick up two stones in the corner.




Dia. 3

Problem Three (5-kyu). Can White pull off something at the top?


Dia. 1. White 1 clearly fails when Black gives




Problem Three: White to play



Dia. 1



Dia. 2



Dia. 3


atari at 2. If next Black cuts at 'a', White captures with 'b'.

Dia. 2. Cutting first at 1 is the correct order. Black has to play 2, but now when White plays 3, Black can only give atari once. After White 5 Black is helpless, so White can capture his six stones on the right.

Dia. 3. This means that Black must compromise with 2, letting White capture two stones.


Correction

There was a mistake in Dia. 5, Problem Two (Page 35) in GW15. When White plays 1 in the diagram, Black prevents him from connecting under by simply giving atari at 2.




Practical Tactics and Tesuji

Rin Kaiho, 9-dan



Problem


Problem. Black caps White's corner approach with 2. 'I'm not afraid to depart from standard joseki,' he seems to be saying. 'Well then, let's see if you know how to handle this,' White replies with 3. There are some pretty bad results Black can get if he doesn't know, but if he does know, White will be the one in trouble.




Dia. 1

Dia. 1: correct. First defend, then attack. After taking the corner with 1, Black is ready to strike on either the left or the upper side. If White responds at 'a', for example, Black has a good pincer at 'b'. The three-three point is the key, as it frequently is in star-point joseki.

Dia. 2: continuation. The main risk in playing 1 is that White will cut through the knight's move at 2, but if he does so immediately –




Dia. 2




Dia. 3

Dia. 3: continuation. Black simply pushes and cuts with 1 to 7. After 9, he is guaranteed a good result. If this fight scares you, you had better give up the game.

Dia. 4: variation. There is another way White can cut through the knight's move. The result through 3 looks more like *gomoku-narabe* (five-in-a-row) than go. Black is not in an unfavourable position, but there are certain complications involved, so –




Dia. 4




Dia. 5

Dia. 5: good. Black is probably better off giving way with 2. Both sides break through at 5 and 6. Black has a large territory and a good result.

Dia. 6: bad. Going back to the beginning, for some reason most players are tempted to make a contact play with Black 1, but that is simply not good. After White 4, for example, Black has serious weaknesses at 'a' and 'b'.




Dia. 6



Dia. 7

Dia. 7: also bad. Seeing that Dia. 6 does not work, Black tries the contact play on the other side, but White 2 leaves him in a fix. For lack of anything better, he ends up doing the same thing as before with 3 and 5; now he has weaknesses at 'a', 'b', and 'c'.

Dia. 8: also bad. Black's attempted application of the attach-and-extend joseki leaves his original capping move (triangled) in a ridiculous position. This is grotesque.




Dia. 8


('Gekkan Gogaku' June 1979. Translated by J. Davies)

Good and Bad Style


Problem: Black to play




66




67



68




69




70


Vulgar Style




The tight connection of 1 is too inefficient.




Black 1 is another heavy move. After White 2 Black has no good continuation, but if he does nothing, White will attack with 'a'.



Black 1 and 3 only help White to defend his weak point.




Black 1 only helps White to split Black into two, while having no effect on White $\triangle$.




Black 1, trying to push through the knight's move, is a model bad move.


Correct Style




Black 1 here is more effective.




If at any time White plays 2, Black counters by playing a ko with 3. This makes good shape.




The light move of 1 makes good shape.




White more or less has to defend against Black 'a' with 2, so Black improves his shape even further with 3.




Cutting across the knight's move with 1 is good style.




When White plays 2 and 4, Black has the follow-up tesuji of 5. If White 'a', Black cuts with 'b'.




Black 1 is correct shape.



White will still play 2, but now Black has a good continuation at 'a' or 'b'.






Once again cutting across the knight's move is the tesuji.






This gives Black a very satisfying squeeze. Note that if White omits 8, Black 8 kills him.

Life and Death Page




1. How many of these black groups can be saved if Black plays first in each?






2. How many of these white groups can be killed?



3. How many of these black groups are unconditionally dead?




4. How many of these white groups are unconditionally alive?




Answers are on the next two pages.

Solutions


1. Answer: two




Black lives by playing 1. White 2 and Black 3 are miai for two eyes.




Black lives by making the throw-in at 1 and squeezing White with 3. White cannot connect at 1.




Black cannot live. Though he expands his eye space to the limit with 1 and 3, White kills him with 4, 6, and 8.



Be careful not to block at 1 first. White 2 means that Black's second eye is false.




If Black simply gives atari at 1 however, White kills him by sacrificing an extra stone at the key point with 2.




Descending at 1 here, instead of Black 3 in the top diagram, leads to an even quicker death.

2. Answer: three




6 connects


Black kills White with the hane at 1 and descent at 3. If White blocks at 4, Black gives atari at 5, then plays 7, leaving him with one eye.




Black kills White by giving atari at 1, then cutting at 3. White is caught short of liberties and can play neither 'a' nor 'b'.




Black kills White by descending at 1. This is the critical point; if Black began at 2 or 6, White 1 would live.



Black 3 in the top diagram was the key move. To try to link up with 1 here would be to lose everything.




Black must not cut first, or White will gain a ko with 2.




Following the diagram above, Black descends again at 7. If White 8, Black 9. White is dead on the bulky-five shape.


3. Answer: one




Black is dead. If he blocks at 1, White 2 gives him a dead shape. Next the points below and to the left of 2 are miai.



Black can get a ko with 1–5. Black 3 is the important move. If Black just plays 5, White 3 kills him.




Black can live by clamping at 1. White's triangled stone cannot escape, and that is Black's second eye.




Black 1 here leads to the White tesuji at 4. If Black plays 5 at 'a', White makes an eye-destroying throw-in at 'b'.


4. Answer: none




White is in atari, so he must capture with 6, but if he tries to kill Black with 8, Black 9 starts a ko.




If White connects with 2, Black simply gives atari at 3.




Black obtains a ko from the throw-in at 1. He fails, however, if he plays 1 at 3, White connecting at 1.




Black kills White by sacrificing two stones with 1. After White captures them with 4 –




A thousand-year ko is the result of the odd-looking move at 1. White has no choice but to play 2 and 4.



If White answers 1 at 2, he is unconditionally dead.



Black makes the throw-in at 5 and kills him unconditionally with 7.



Black makes the placement at 5, forcing White 6, and thrusts in at 7 for his ko. White now turns elsewhere.

(From a supplement to the December 1979 'Gekkan Gogaku')


How to Improve at Fuseki (12)

Kato Honinbo


Positions on the Side

For the concluding article in this series, we would like to look at some of the basic patterns that come up on the side. Familiarising oneself with these patterns is a necessary complement to study of the whole-board fuseki patterns.


Pattern One. In this position, with a white star-point stone opposing Black's small knight corner enclosure at the top, White often makes the wide Δ extension along the side. The problem for investigation is how Black should respond to this move.



Pattern One



Dia. 1: wrong



Dia. 2: correct


Dia. 1. The first point is that Black has no outstanding answer. This said, let's look at the stan-

dard approach move of 1 here. If White is generous enough to answer at 2, Black gets ideal shape with 3 and 5. Black's group is quite safe after 5, while in contrast White has a cramped position even after extending to 6.


Dia. 2. Answering 1 with White 2 is absolutely essential. This makes full use of the Δ stone, as Black can only extend two spaces from his two-stone wall. The result to 6 is a clear contrast to Dia. 1: this time Black is the one with the cramped position. The moves to 6 are a set sequence and can be considered a joseki for the side.

A peaceful continuation is Black 'a', White 'b'. The question of whether White gets a chance to invade at 'c' or Black forestalls him by playing Black 'd'—White 'e'—Black 'f' will have a crucial bearing on the development of the game.

Dia. 3. If White makes a pincer at 2, the best and simplest thing is to go into the corner at 3. The exchange to 11 is satisfactory for Black as White gets an over-concentrated position, with Δ ending up too close to his own thickness.




Dia. 3



Dia. 4

Dia. 4. Invading at 1, without making an approach move, is also possible. White will probably extend to 2, so Black can then play on the other side at 3. If White 4, he jumps out to 5, his aim being to keep the white forces separated. A fight in which there are no set patterns follows, so this way of playing can be recommended to those confident in their fighting ability.




Dia. 5

Dia. 5. From one of my games. The position will become fractionalised if Black follows Dia. 2, so he ventures to play on the other side at 1, but this is a little questionable. The reason is that White 6 becomes an ideal point, making $\triangle$ work at maximum efficiency. Black should after all have followed Dia. 2 or Dia. 4.


Pattern 2. Opposing 3–4 point stones confront each other on the side. The first player to make an approach move clearly gets an advantage on this side, but White's high approach move at 2 is an attempt to upset this advantage. Note that it has long been an established theory that the low move at 'a' is bad, as Black can answer at 'b', an ideal combination of extension and pincer.

Dia. 6. If Black 1, the pattern to 6 follows and this time White gets ideal shape, as 6 is the highly-valued combination of extension and pincer.


Dia. 7. In this case the pincer at 1 is an




Pattern 2




Dia. 6







Dia. 10



Pattern 3



Dia. 11



Dia. 12

concentrated at the top.

For the above reason Black switches to 4 to avoid falling in with White's wishes. After the joseki sequence to 18, White is able to press at 19, which was the aim of his strategy.

Answering at 'a' is not attractive for Black — since his group at the top right is already solid, this would make him over-concentrated at the top. He therefore develops rapidly with 20 and 22. White gets a lot of profit with 21, but Black is satisfied with occupying the large fuseki point of 22. The strategy of the two players here is very instructive.

The fuseki is a fight to gain an advantage, that is, a struggle to create ideal shape for oneself. Taking advantage of a favourable ladder to get the result in Dia. 8, for example, would make a very nice start to a game.

Pattern 3. The problem here is more than just getting ideal shape. With luck, one can do as well as if one had caught the opponent in a trap.

White 2 is the notorious taisha, the move with a thousand variations.

Dia. 11. This is the standard taisha sequence. If the exchange of 16 and 17 is realised, the trap has already been sprung.


Dia. 12. White 1 is a severe move. The moves to 6 are a joseki, but when White prevents Black from connecting with 7, Black is in trouble. He would like to cut at 'a', but this would only invite White to give atari at 'b'. White would just keep on pushing up and the four black stones below would wither on the bough. Black therefore has to try to escape without cutting, but he is clearly in for a very hard time. This is an ideal shape for White — Black has been tricked.

If following joseki gives a bad result, Black must switch at some point. One possibility is to omit 1 in Dia. 11, playing immediately at 3. Alternatively, Black could play 13 at 'a'. This lets White capture two stones with 'b', but in exchange Black gets sente. This would be a small local loss for Black, but it would be better than getting tricked on a large scale as in Dia. 12.

Actually I myself once had a nasty experience with Pattern 3.

Dia. 13. This is from the second game of the 1978 Honinbo title match (see GW 9). I blithely played the sequence to 19, assuming that I could make a reasonable fight of it by cutting with 21 and 23. However, I got into serious trouble after White 30, so I should have switched from joseki at some stage. Apart from the possibilities mentioned earlier, I could have played 15 at 'a' or switched to the approach move at 'b'.

(*'Igo Club'*, December 1979)





How Would You Play Here?

Miyamoto Naoki

Problem 1. White to play.


In the castle games of the Edo Period, the outstanding record of nineteen wins and no losses was made by Honinbo Shusaku. The game of the nineteen that was most difficult for him to win was the fourth (1850), in which he faced Ito Showa, another member of the Honinbo house. After 39 moves this game had reached the position shown at right, and here Showa played a stone that gave Shusaku an almost certain loss. It was only by struggling desperately for over three hundred more moves that Shusaku was able to recover. Showa's play was one of A to D.



Problem 2. Black to play.


We are at a difficult point in the middle game. Which of A to D is best?

Problem 1. D is correct.



Dia. 1

Dia. 1. Showa's play was the two-space jump to White 1. This is a classic example of building territory (to the right) while attacking (to the left). Black is in a very difficult position.




Dia. 2

Dia. 2. To take the other moves, A is the worst, inviting trouble. Black will jump to 'a' and White will have weak stones to both right and left.

White B would be a safe move, and the difference between it and Black 'b' is not small, but White is napping on the job if he plays this way; he risks losing the initiative. Black may start attacking the white group on the upper side,


for example.

White C maintains the initiative, but ignores the framework in the lower right.



Dia. 3


Dia. 3. Black will jump to 2. White is chasing him into the framework that he ought to be keeping him out of. White's strategy should be to attack from the direction of 1, make Black run upwards, and use that as a cue to defend the left side.



Dia. 4


Dia. 4. This is what happened in the actual game. Black answered White 1 with the contact play at 2, even though this induced an undesirable strengthening of the enemy. White hanged at 3, then made a good attachment at 5. Black could not afford to take gote in the upper left

and have White surround the lower right, so he forced once at 6, then invaded at 8, gambling that he could survive the coming attack.



Dia. 5

Dia. 5. Black defended his invading stone with 12, but this provoked White 13. Ordinarily one would not ignore a move like 13 and let White hane at 27, but Black was desperate to stay in the game territorially, and counted on being able to live in the ko started by 34.




Dia. 6

Dia. 6. For reference, these are the moves that led up to the problem.*


*The complete game record appears in Ohira's *Appreciating Famous Games*, pp.277-279.

Problem 2. C is correct.




Dia. 1

Dia. 1. The important thing is for Black and White not to worry about the four black stones in the upper left. It is the center and right side that matter, and Black 1 looks appropriate. If White captures the four stones with 'a', Black enlarges his framework with 'b'.



Dia. 2

Dia. 2. If it were White's turn, he would also play in the center, going as far as 1. This move rather diminishes the effect of Black's wall. If Black answers 1 by trying to surround territory on the right, there is a limit to how much he can get, and his four stones in the upper left will be swallowed whole.




Dia. 3

Dia. 3. Black A would be excellent for taking territory on the right side, but in view of Black's thickness below it is too conservative.

Black B is assuredly a large point, but not as large as the center.

Black D, attempting to rescue the four stones, is the most doubtful move of all.




Dia. 4

Dia. 4. White will answer Black 1 at 2, pursuing him and simultaneously wiping out his framework to the right. Black immediately falls behind if he plays this way. There are times when you have to sacrifice a few stones or see your whole game come apart, and this is one of them.

(*'Gekkan Gogaku'* July 1979. Translated by J. Davies)

Joseki Amateurs Don't Know


Abe Yoshiteru 8-dan




Basic Pattern

Basic Pattern. Among the variations of the one-space low pincer against a one-space high approach to the three-four point, there are a number that start with White 1 to 3. The ones in which Black plays next at 'a' are fairly well known, but the ones in which he makes the slightly surprising diagonal play at 4 are not. How should White respond?

Dia. 1. Unsatisfactory. White is not going to get a good result by just descending at 1; Black 2,



Dia. 1




Dia. 2

extending sideways, sees to that. If White continues with 3 and 5, Black can extend again to 6. White is still not alive in the corner.

Dia. 2. Better, but — . The reason White did so badly in Dia. 1 was that he simply gave atari at 3. If he cuts across the knight's move with 1 in this diagram first, he gains tempo to press at 7. If we assume the sequence through 15, he gets a much better corner. Black, however, makes ponukis on both sides and ends in sente, so the overall result still favors him.


Dia. 3. Tesuji. Suppose White reverses the order of 1 and 3 in Dia. 1, so as to make Black connect at 2. He is hoping next for Black 'a', White 'b'. Black, however, confounds him with the belly tesuji at 4. White now has a choice of three variations, all unfavourable.



Dia. 4. First variation. Continuing from Dia. 3, White lives in the corner with 5, 7, and 9, but Black strengthens himself on both sides. The three white stones in the middle are left very weak, not a very satisfactory state of affairs.

Note that Black must not play 8 at 9. White 'a', Black 'b', White 'c', and White wins the capturing race by one move.


Dia. 5. Second variation. White can also live by giving atari and connecting with 1 and 3, but Black defends with 4, 6, and 8 and once again White's center stones are left too weak.



Dia. 6. Third variation. White can sacrifice the corner with 1 to 5, but his shape on the outside leaves much to be desired — a stone at 'a' in particular.


Dia. 7. Delusion. This time White has begun by cutting across at 1. If Black answers at 2, White 3 and 5 become sente and White gets to play 7, which is what he wants, but if he really expects Black to cooperate like this he is deluding himself.

Dia. 8. Black takes the corner. Black will counter White 1 by giving atari at 2 and extend-




ing at 4. White gets outside thickness with 5 and 7, but this does not begin to compensate for the loss of the corner.

Dia. 9. Another bad result. What if White lives with 1 and 3? The trouble with this is that Black will reply at 4, threatening to kill White with 'a'. The 5-6 exchange does not remove this threat. White 'b' would remove it, but at the cost of having Black grow stronger with 'c'. For White, this is little better than Dias. 4 and 5.



Dia. 10. Correct. With every other move eliminated, all we have left is the atari at 1. Fortunately, it works. When Black descends at 2, White extends at 3. It should go without saying that Black must not play 2 at 3 and let White have a ponnuki.




Dia. 11. Continuation. Black 4 is forced, and White plays the cutting-across tesuji at 5. After White 9, Black 10 and White 11 are miai. After 12, White has thickness and sente and can aim to attack Black at 'a'. Even though his corner is not as big as in Dia. 2, he has a strong position and probably a favourable result.

('Go Weekly' November 28, 1978. Translated by James Davies).

Correcting the Mistake


Kato Honinbo



The Mistake


A pair of amateurs at the 1-2 dan level produced the position above. They seem to have been well taught; their opening plays show extremely good shape. With White 1 and Black 2, however, they both went badly astray.

In thinking over your moves, it often helps to ask yourself where your opponent would play if it were his turn. Let's remove White 1 and Black 2 and think in this way about the board as it stands in Dia. 1. It is White's turn, but suppose



Dia. 1


it were Black's — where would he play? One look at the tremendous wall he has on the right side and the answer becomes obvious: he would extend from it across the upper side.



Dia. 2

White should therefore forestall him by extending to 1 in Dia. 2. Since Black would not waste time in the lower left with 'a' or 'b', 'c' is not an urgent move.

Instead of extending to 1, however, White made the triangled move in Dia. 3. Now it is




Dia. 3

Black's turn, but let's reverse the situation again and imagine it is White's. Would White attack at 'a' or 'b'? Hardly — he would make the same extension as in Dia. 2.

For that reason, Black should extend to 1 in Dia. 4; this remains the best point for both sides. There is no use in playing 'a' as Black did, defending a group that White was not going to attack anyway. Of course if White did attack it, Black would have nothing to fear.


Let's think on a bit from Dia. 4. If it were Black's turn after 1, he would like to add another




Dia. 4

stone in the upper right corner, leaving White with no easy invasion point. White, accordingly, should answer Black 1 by invading at 2 in Dia. 5 before Black can shut him out. Black 3 to White 6 are a standard continuation. Black's move next — well, where would White want to play? If you keep thinking like this, your moves should fall right into place.

How about playing Black 1 on the third line, as in Dia. 6? This is also a good point, but it gives White a good reply in the combination of 2 and 4. Not to give your opponent good moves is another principle of the game. Black 1 is not actually bad, but it compares unfavorably with the extension on the fourth line. The same would hold for White's playing 1; Black would



Dia. 5



Dia. 6

cap him at 2. It frequently happens that both sides are after the same point.
(*'Gekkan Gogaku'* May 1979. Translated by J. Davies.)

Small-Board Problems

James Davies

Killing all your opponent's stones may be just a dream on the 19 x 19 board, but on the 6 x 6 board it is a real possibility. You can do it in several of the problems below.

Problem 1. Black to play and win.


Problem 2. Black to play and win.

Problem 3. Black to play and win.


Problem 4. White to play and win. Note that he has taken two prisoners.

Problem 5. White to play and win.


Problem 6. White to play and win. Taking the ko is permitted. Whether it is a good idea or not is for you to decide.




Problem 1




Problem 2




Problem 3
Prisoners: ○



Problem 4
Prisoners: ●●




Problem 5




Problem 6
Prisoners: ○

ANSWERS

1. Answer. All it takes to win the board is the throw-in at 1. This obviously kills the lower right group, and White is dead in the upper left too.




1. Answer




Dia. 1

Dia. 1: failure. But if Black reverses the order of 1 and 3, he loses the board.

2. Answer. The sacrifice at 3 is the key to this problem. White captures at 4, but —




2. Answer




Dia. 1

Dia. 1: continuation. Black 5 means White's total annihilation.

3. Answer. Here the problem is how to live on the lower side, and Black 1 provides the solution. Black wins by two points. It would do White no good to cut at 3; Black would just connect on the bottom edge.




3. Answer




Dia. 1

Dia. 1: failure. The diagonal connection at 1 leads to a ko that Black loses. He is utterly without ko threats.

4. Answer. White 1 and 3 start a ko and White 5 wins it. Since White had two prisoners before the ko started, this puts him one point ahead.



4. Answer




Dia. 1


7: ko, 9: connects

Dia. 1: disaster. If Black plays 1 here, White cuts at 2.

5. Answer. White wins with 1. If Black replied on the upper edge, White 2 would make short work of him.




5. Answer




Dia. 1

Dia. 1: failure. White 1 here is the second-best move, capturing two stones, but that only suffices to lose the game by one point.

6. Answer. White starts by descending at 1. If Black plays 2, White takes the ko with 3. Black has no ko threats and White wins the game by a wide margin.




6. Answer




Dia. 1

Dia. 1: variation. If Black connects at 1, White hanes at 2. After 6 Black has no way to stop White from taking the ko at 4, then capturing the five stones around 1.

Dia. 2: variation. Black's cleverest defense is to connect at 1, but White defeats that with the even cleverer throw-in at 2. If Black captures White 2, White takes the ko. If Black plays 1 at 2, White plays 2 at 1.




Dia. 2



Dia. 3

Dia. 3: failure. If White takes the ko immediately with 1, he loses. It should be easy to verify that after 4 he cannot win the fight, and in fact his whole group is dead.

Dia. 4: failure. White 1 here is better, but still not good enough. Black takes the corner with 2 and 4, and 6 puts him a point ahead.



Dia. 4

1979 British Championship

This year's challenger for the British Championship, Terry Stacey, is a newcomer to the top level tournament scene. He virtually came out of the blue to win the Challengers' League, but his solid performance in the 1979 European Championship — 7th place with a 5—4 score in a field of twenty — showed that this was no fluke. In the championship match, however, the superior experience of the champion, Matthew Macfadyen, prevailed and he rebuffed the challenger by a 3—1 margin. Results:

Game One (18th August). Macfadyen (W) won by 12½ points.

Game Two (25th August). Stacey (W) won by resignation.

Game Three (8th September). Macfadyen (W) won by resignation.

Game Four (6th October). Macfadyen (B) won by resignation.

Below we present a commentary by Sakai Masanori 4-dan on the final game.

Game Four

White: T. W. Stacey 4-dan

Black: M.R. Macfadyen 5-dan

komi: 5½; time: 3 hours each

date: 6th October, 1979




Figure 1 (1 - 45)


Figure 1 (1 - 45)

Black 1. Macfadyen is not noted for conventional openings. He tried the same move in the second game, followed by a play on the 5—5 point.


White 6. Approaching the corner would be more usual — White 6 at 7 would be excellent here — but 6 is quite playable.

Black 29 was uncalled-for; Black should simply have played 35. Black may have wanted to ward off a white forcing move at 'a', but White would not play 'a', since Black 'b' would weaken his stones above. White now takes sente with 30, but —

White 32 should have been a line to the right.



Dia. 1



Dia. 2

Dia. 1. The invasion at 3, preceded by the forcing move at 1, poses a considerable threat.

White may have been thinking that 32 struck the right balance between the single stone at 4 and the two-stone wall at 14 and 16, but he has more flexibility to the left than to the right, so he could more easily tolerate an invasion there.

Dia. 2. White 1 is correct. If Black invades at 2, White defends at 3. If instead Black invades at 'a', there is White 2, Black 'b', White 'c'. In addition, White 1 has more attacking value against Black's center group, which cannot link up at 'd' because of White 'e'.

Black 33 should again be simply 35, aiming at 1 and 3 in Dia. 1.

Black 41 punishes White for his over-extension. An invasion on the star-point, as in Dia. 1, would have been even better.




Figure 2 (46 - 110)
81: connects

Figure 2 (46 - 110)


White 46. An overplay.

Dia. 3. White should have connected at 1, letting Black capture with 2 and 4 while he links up with 3 and 5.


Dia. 4. He may have been worried about Black 1 here, but after Black crosses under at 5 White counters with 6 and Black is the one in trouble.

White 52. An emergency tesuji. It works, but the fact that White has to resort to such measures is proof of the trouble he is in.


Black 55. Good. If White comes out at 57,




Dia. 3



Dia. 4



Dia. 5



Dia. 6

Black plays a nose tesuji at the right of 57.

Dia. 5. What if Black had separated White with 1 here? White lives with 2 through 12 and the 5-6 exchange helps him in the upper left. He could also play 10 at 11, if he wanted to be troublesome.

Black 57. Separating White is now impossible.

Dia. 6. If Black plays 1 and 3, White captures him with 2 to 6. If 3 at 4, White 3.

White 64. White has survived, but at the price of giving Black powerful thickness. This does fatal damage to White's game.


Black 65. A slower-paced move is in order — Black 89, say, or Black 1 in *Dia. 7*.

Dia. 7. Black 1 attacks from afar and White can find no good reply. White 2 invites Black 3 and 5, while if White plays 2 at 5, Black pursues him with 'a'.


White 66. White should connect at 80.

Black 67. Black should hane at 68.


Dia. 8. Black need not fear White 2, because



Dia. 7



Dia. 8



Dia. 9

3 is sente. He can fight with 5 and 7.


Black 69. This time Black should play straight, at 70.

Dia. 9. This way Black gets a clean, solid shape, and if White tries later to live in the corner with 'a', Black can kill him with 'b'. If White plays 4 at 5, Black pushes through at 4 and cuts, leaving White to try to make two eyes on the side.


White 74 to 80. White gets a nice squeeze, and Black is pushing him out (at 76) as from a nozzle, which is generally bad.

White 82 looks natural, but there is a much better tesuji here.

Dia. 10. White should descend at 1. If Black defends at 2, White 3 makes perfect linkage. Con-



Dia. 10



Dia. 11
10: connects

sidering the shape Black's group is left in, White might have the lead.

Dia. 11. If Black answers 1 at 2 here, White squeezes with 3 through 9. White 11 threatens 12, then White lives by crawling at 13, being willing to give up 5 and 11.

White 84 leaves Black 89, quite a contrast to *Dia. 10*. White has missed his chance to get back into the game.


Black 93. Black 98, keeping White separated, is correct.

White 104. There is a defect in this shape of which Black should take immediate advantage.


Dia. 12. He should play across at 1, sacrificing this stone to cut at 5. White lives in gote with 20, and Black takes a clear lead with 21, still having 'a' to aim at in the center. If White plays 8 at 'b', Black cuts at 10, squeezes, and easily wins the capturing race.

Black 105, however, is not bad. Instead of 109 –

Dia. 13. Black could also live by giving atari from below with 1 and crawling through 11.



Dia. 12



Dia. 13




Figure 3 (111 - 205)

ko: 69, 72, 75, 80, 83, 86, 89, 92; 103: ko at 100
Black 11. A solid connection is best.


Dia. 14. Black connects at 1. If White cuts at 'a' with 4, Black has a perfect ladder block at 8. White cannot ignore Black 5 because of the threat of Black 9 (1 in *Dia. 12*), so he defends at 6. Black forces at 8, then wins the game by taking the corner with 10.

White 14 and 16. Good forcing moves. Black's shape becomes heavy and he ultimately draws gote at 33.


Black 41. The correct move is one line higher, on the edge.

Dia. 15. There is danger that White will start a ko with 3 and 5.


Dia. 16. With 1 here there would be no danger.



Dia. 14



Dia. 15



Dia. 16

White 42. White misses the tesuji in *Dia. 15* and is captured outright.

White 44 etc. White lives through ko in the lower right corner, but still trails in the game — Black has too much center territory. Another ko begins in the lower left, so the game is hopeless for White.

White resigns after Black 205.

(Translated by James Davies)

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All about the Pincer' (Takagawa): GW11

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Satsugen Becomes Meijin Godokoro

The period of stagnation in the go world following the death of Dochi in 1727 came to an end with the accession of the 9th Honinbo Satsugen in 1754. Satsugen (1733 – 88) was an impetuous, unruly genius whose tenacious campaigning to achieve his aims shocked the go world out of its lethargy and split it right down the middle.

The story of Satsugen's life is one of uncompromising ambition. When he became the head of his house in 1754, three successive Honinbos – Chihaku, Shuhaku and Hakugen – had died (all in their twenties) as 6-dans. Satsugen was determined to wipe out this disgrace by becoming Meijin godokoro, as quickly as possible, an ambition which would have seemed the height of presumption to his seniors if they had known of it.

At this time the senior figure in the go world was the 6th Inoue, Inoue Shunseki Inseki (1707 – 72), who was then 7-dan. Satsugen's strategy was first to catch up, wait for Shunseki to go for 8-dan and to try and make it with him, and then to challenge him for Meijin.

In 1756 Satsugen attempted to obtain Shunseki's approval for his application for promotion to 7-dan (when the post of godokoro was vacant, a consensus of the go heads was necessary to obtain government approval of promotions), but not surprisingly Shunseki wanted to maintain his preeminence, so he tried every delaying tactic, short of outright opposition, at his command. In this way he succeeded in blocking Satsugen's promotion to 7-dan until the following year.

Seven years later, in 1764, Shunseki was promoted to 8-dan and despite his efforts to prevent it, Satsugen was promoted along with him. The time was now ripe for the climax of Satsugen's campaign. In 1766 he made overtures to Shunseki requesting his cooperation in a proposed application by Satsugen for promotion to Meijin, but predictably enough Shunseki, who had probably dreamed of the post for himself, would not hear of it. He was not the only one who thought that Satsugen's ambition was presumptuous and premature – Yasui Sankaku, who had for decades been a Honinbo ally, became disgusted with what he considered Satsugen's unreasonableness and so went over to the Inoue side. However, there was a counterbalancing defection, for the new head of the Hayashi house, till then allied with the

Inoues, went over to the Honinbo side.

The stage was now set for the final move in Satsugen's campaign. With Hayashi's backing, he applied to the government for permission to hold a twenty-game match with Shunseki with promotion to the rank of Meijin as the prize. This permission was forthcoming and the match began with the castle game played in November that year.

According to tradition, the first game was drawn, so the series really began with the second game, played in the same month. Satsugen won five games straight, so Shunseki ceded the match and withdrew his objections to Satsugen's ambition. Satsugen's promotion to Meijin came in September 1767. However, the government delayed his appointment as godokoro until June 1770, perhaps to show *its* displeasure with Satsugen's headstrong behaviour.

Game Two

White: Inoue Shunseki Inseki

Black: Honinbo Satsugen

date: 27th – 30th November, 1766

Since the first game had been the traditional prearranged jigo, this game was in effect the real start to the series. It proved to be a good indicator of how the series was to go.

Figure 1 (1 – 51)

Nowadays White 8 would of course be played at 'a', while Black 9 would either be at 'b' or 'c' at the top or at 'd' at the bottom.

Black 15 is a good splitting play, but perhaps





Figure 1 (1 – 51)

White played 14 in order to set up the pincer at 20. If so, suddenly switching to the top with 22 is rather strange, as it lets Black take the initiative at the bottom with 23 etc.

Black 35 is a superb answer to the peep at 34. If White pushed through at 1 in Dia. 1, Black counters with 2 to 18. In the game Black gets an ideal result up to 45, securing his eye-shape in sente.

White 48—Black 51. Not a great result for White — the reason will be apparent later. White 48 should have been an approach move in the top right.



Dia. 1

Dia. 2




Figure 2 (51 – 100)

Figure 2 (51 – 100)

Black 53, 59. Solid moves — Black clearly feels that he is ahead.

Black 65 – 69. Somewhat passive, allowing White to catch up a little. Playing aggressively as in Dia. 2 would be more interesting. This would give Black thickness, whereas in the game White gets thickness and secures his group with 72 and 74. However, living in the top left corner with 75 to 87 reestablishes Black's lead.





Figure 3 (101 – 150)

Black 89 at 90 (White would play 'a') would be insipid.

White 96 to 100 are good moves, but White will have to get a very big centre to win.



Dia 3

Figure 3 (101 – 150)

Black 1. A calm, solid move, though Black could also have tried 1 in Dia. 3. He would have nothing to fear from White 2 and 4.

White 2 is a desperate attempt to take all the centre, the only way White can hope to win.

White 32. To create ko threats. If Black plays 35 at 38, White will




Figure 4 (151 – 230)

White wins and connects the ko

play a ko with 35.

Black loses the capturing race in the centre, but since he can come in from the other side with 41 and 49, this is not disastrous.

Figure 4 (151 – 230)

Black wins by 8 points.

Game Four

White: Inoue Shunseki Inseki

Black: Honinbo Satsugen

date: 18th January – 7th February, 1767




Figure 1 (1 – 63)

Figure 1 (1 – 63)

White 32. If at 34, Black will strike at 'a'.

White 34. White seems obsessed with expanding his bottom area, but it's high time to switch to




Figure 2 (64 – 100)




Figure 3 (101 – 150)




Figure 4 (151 – 201)

the top. When he finally invades at 44, White comes under tremendous pressure.

Figure 2 (64 – 100)

White's sacrifices gain nothing – he should play at 82 immediately. Black takes the superb point of 75 and begins to build up an enormous moyo on the right.

White plays it out to the bitter end, but he is unable to make a sufficient reduction in Black's moyo. His mistaken fuseki strategy crippled his whole game.

Moves after 200 omitted. Black wins by 13 points.

As we have seen, Satsugen had no trouble winning his games with black. In the next issue, we will look at his masterpiece of the series, the third game, in which he had white.



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